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The unifying theme of this dissertation is to ask questions about how pricing in-
efficiencies and institutional characteristics interact to influence the aggregate real
outcomes of countries in an open economy setting in which each country’s monetary
policy is set optimally. Chapter 1 tries to answer the question of whether openness is
inflationary using a two-country general equilibrium model with optimal monetary
policy that is explicitly derived from microeconomic foundations. Imperfect com-
petition plays a key role and is modeled as a degree of inelasticity of substitution
among differentiated goods. I find that a country’s inflation rate increases with its
degree of openness and that this inflationary effect is dampened by the degree of
imperfect competition.
vi
In Chapter 2, I ask the same question of whether openness is inflationary,
but I change the imperfect competition structure from Chapter 1 so that workers
supply differentiated labor to a competitive final goods producer. This more closely
follows the theoretical story cited by much of the empirical literature on openness
and inflation. However, the interesting result in Chapter 2 is that the implications
for optimal monetary policy and real outcomes are the same as in Chapter 1. That
is, the source of the imperfect competition does not matter. Chapter 2 then goes on
to evaluate much of the empirical literature on the basis of whether it controls for
imperfect competition among goods producers and among suppliers of labor. Finally
Chapter 2 includes an empirical test of the theory. Using a sample from 1987 to
2002, the data confirm the implication of my model that increased openness can be
inflationary—a result that contradicts much of the previous empirical literature
Lastly, Chapter 3 deals with the question of how a monetary authority should
respond to foreign monetary policy. The model relaxes the assumption of rational
expectations in order to generate steady state equilibria that are neither overly
inflationary nor independent of foreign monetary policy. The resulting monetary
policy rules are well below the upper bound of money growth and are an increasing
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The goal of this paper is to try to answer the question of whether or not increased
openness to international markets is inflationary using a structural international
general equilibrium model derived from microeconomic foundations. This question
has been the subject of a large body of research beginning as early as 1962 and
continuing to the present. Most of these papers have been empirical in focus and
provide strong evidence of a negative relationship between openness and inflation.
However, much less work exists that structurally models this relationship beginning
with the behavior of individual agents. This paper is intended as an attempt at
furthering the theoretical understanding of some specific channels through which
economic openness may influence a country’s inflation rate.
A major focus of this work and one of its main innovations is how the level
of imperfect competition, both within a country and between countries, affects the
relationship between openness and inflation. Some of the literature has begun to as-
sess the relationship between imperfect competition and inflation in open economies,
but this is the first paper that specifically models how imperfect competition affects
the relationship between openness and inflation.
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To address this question, I use a two-country overlapping generations (OLG)
model in which agents are born in each country in each period and live for only
two periods. The agents use their labor to produce a differentiated good in the first
period of their lives for which they enjoy a degree of market power, and they sell
the good to consumers from both countries in exchange for the producers’ country’s
currency. A monetary authority in each country chooses and commits to a money
growth rate at the beginning of time and implements that policy through non-
proportional transfers to the consumers of its own country in each period so as to
maximize the welfare of its citizens.
The results derived from this model run counter to most of the findings from
the literature addressing the question of the effect of openness on inflation. I find
that an increased level of openness actually increases the steady-state equilibrium
inflation rate in a country. In a closed economy and in environments in which money
is not neutral, increased money growth generates inflation which provides a leisure
subsidy and levies a consumption tax. However, in the environment laid out in this
paper, increased openness to international trade opens up two new channels through
which a country’s inflation rate benefits its citizens.
First, increased openness reduces the burden of the inflation tax borne by the
citizens of the inflating country in that they spend a larger portion of their currency
holdings on Foreign goods. Second, inflation causes the terms of trade to appreciate
in favor of the Home country. That is, the price of exports increase in relation
to the price of imports. These two benefits working together result in a country’s
real wage increasing in response to higher Home inflation levels. These benefits are
generated by a degree of market power enjoyed by each monetary authority in the
international markets due to the assumption that consumers in each country prefer
some consumption combination of its own country’s production, the assumption that
a consumer’s expenditure share on the other country’s goods is inelastic to some
degree, and the institutional assumption that consumers must hold both countries’
currencies in order to consume both of their goods. The problem of the monetary
authority then becomes choosing the money growth rate and the associated rate of
inflation so as to balance the resulting consumption tax with the real-wage benefit
(consumption tax burden shift plus terms of trade appreciation).
In addition, I find that the level of imperfect competition among the pro-
ducers within a country acts as a perfect substitute for the market power enjoyed
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by a country’s monetary authority. That is, an increased level of imperfect com-
petition among producers within a country reduces the benefits that result from
inflation generated by that country’s monetary authority. Put differently, a fixed
amount of international monopoly rents are available to the citizens of each country
given the structure of the model, and whatever percentage of those rents are not
obtained through the pricing behavior of each country’s producers is obtained by
that country’s monetary authority changing the inflation rate through the money
growth rate. So this model predicts a negative relation between a country’s infla-
tion rate and the level of imperfect competition, given the degree of openness to
international markets. Thus, the channel through which openness affects inflation
is the international market power that a country enjoys.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1.2, I survey the literature
that has addressed the question of openness and inflation. Section 1.3 presents the
model and its equilibrium properties. Section 1.4 presents the key results from the
model, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature
This paper’s place in the international monetary literature is to provide a simple
attempt at a micro-founded structural model of openness, inflation, and imperfect
competition in order to try to match the relationship between openness and inflation
documented in the empirical literature. The oldest branch of the theoretical liter-
ature uses a structural model that is an international version of Barro and Gordon
(1983) which predicts that, other things equal, openness leads to a lower inflation
rate. But a newer branch of the literature can be loosely grouped under the rubric
of “new open economy macroeconomics” (NOEM) models, and predicts that, other
things equal, more openness leads to a higher inflation rate. The modeling approach
I use in this paper will follow the NOEM style for reasons that I will detail below.
One of the earliest empirical papers addressing the question of the relation-
ship between openness and inflation, although somewhat indirectly, is Triffin and
Grubel (1962). Using data from six European countries during the 1950s, they
provide evidence that inflationary pressures are more correlated, and thus less in-
dependent, across countries that are more integrated. They propose that, among
countries that are more open and integrated, inflation generated by a monetary au-
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thority can have more of an effect on the balance of payments, than on inflation.
However, they only mention in passing that this balance of payments effect can
only be short-term, and they assume no optimizing behavior by the government,
consumers, or firms.
In his famous AEA Presidential address, Friedman (1968) proposed that
monetary policy should target inflation or money growth rates. But he also added
indirectly that exchange rate targeting could be more desirable if imports were a
bigger share of GDP, thus implying a potential connection between openness and
inflation.1
The first structural model directly addressing the question of openness and
inflation is Rogoff (1985). His approach is to extend the Barro and Gordon (1983)
framework to a two-country Mundell-Fleming model. As in Barro and Gordon,
a labor market friction causes the optimal time-consistent policy of the monetary
authority to be increased inflation in order to raise the level of employment. How-
ever, in Rogoff’s international version, the increased inflation has an extra cost in
that optimal employment is a function of the real exchange rate and that the real
exchange rate depreciates with higher inflation. Thus the optimal time-consistent
inflation rate chosen by a monetary authority is lower as the deteriorating effect on
the exchange rate increases. More openness leads to a lower equilibrium inflation
rate in this time consistent environment.
The empirical literature testing the effect of openness on inflation primarily
cites the model and conclusions of Rogoff (1985). The most important empirical pa-
per that addresses this question is Romer (1993). He cites the Rogoff prediction that,
in his time-consistent environment, more openness should lead to lower inflation. In
his regressions, Romer controls for endogeneity, includes political controls, develop-
ment level controls, regional controls, and uses many different samples of countries
over the post-Bretton Woods period from 1973 to the early 1990s. Romer’s empiri-
cal findings lend support to the theoretical results of Rogoff (1985) in that he finds
robust evidence of a negative relationship between openness and inflation and that
the negative relationship becomes weaker in countries with less independent central
banks and more political instability.2
1On page 15, Friedman makes the contrapositive statement that, with only 5 percent of U.S.
resources devoted to international trade in 1967, “it would be better to let the market, through
floating exchange rates, adjust to world conditions.”
2A number of empirical papers follow up on Romer (1993), and most of them either confirm his
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Figure 1.1: Import share vs. CPI for 30 OECD countries: annual avg.
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Figure 1.1 shows a scatterplot of the average annual import share and average
annual CPI growth rate for the 30 OECD countries over the period from 1982 to
2005. This picture is similar to figures in Romer (1993) and Wynne and Kersting
(2007) and is common to this empirical literature. However, the conclusions to take
from Figure 1.1 are not obvious. A slight negative correlation exists between import
share and inflation over the sample period (solid line), but that negative relationship
becomes positive when I drop the three high-inflation outliers of Mexico, Poland,
and Turkey (dotted line). Restricting the sample to the G7 countries produces
a positive correlation nearly identical to that of the whole sample minus Mexico,
Poland, and Turkey. When the sample period is shortened to more recent periods,
finding of a negative relationship or find that the relationship is not statistically significant. Wynne
and Kersting (2007) provide a good survey of the empirical literature as well as some of their own
analyses.
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the negative relationship with all the countries and the positive relationship without
the high-inflation countries both diminish to the point where the two predicted value
lines for the year 2005 are nearly indistinguishable and are both slightly positive.
However, none of the slopes in any specification is significantly different from zero.3
The “natural rate” approach of the model used in Rogoff (1985) has been
criticized on a number of dimensions. Azariadis (1981) questions the Phillips curve
assumption of dropping all but the first two terms of a Taylor series expansion
of the aggregate supply equation around the expected logarithm of price. Also,
the natural rate models on which so much of empirical monetary policy today is
based, assume that the welfare of a representative agent is a quadratic loss function
in the deviation of output from its natural rate and in the deviation of inflation
from expected inflation. This type of disutility function is a step removed from
maximization of individual’s utility functions that is standard in most micro-founded
macroeconomics.
Another key characteristic implicit in the Rogoff model is that the labor
market friction that causes the optimal employment level to be higher than the level
desired by the suppliers of labor could be caused by some form of monopoly power
on the part of these suppliers such as a labor union. Thus, the monetary authority
uses the inflationary money injection to induce higher demand which causes the
owners of labor to supply more. Intuitively, the more open an economy is, the
less market power the monopolistic labor suppliers enjoy and the less incentive a
monetary authority has to inflate.
An alternative to the natural rate international models mentioned above for
addressing the relationship between openness and inflation are some more recent
works related to the NOEM models. A number of optimal monetary policy papers
have come out in recently in this vein of the literature that address optimal infla-
tion levels generated by a monetary authority in general equilibrium multi-country
environments in which firms and consumers are acting optimally and the monetary
authority is maximizing the utility of its citizens.
Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Cooper and Kempf (2003) both use models
in which the production market is perfectly competitive to answer the questions of
whether and when countries gain from cooperating in currency unions. An attempt
3Other authors obtain statistically significant correlations by expanding the sample of countries
and by controlling for other variables to isolate the effect of openness on inflation.
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to categorize them might place them close to the “new open economy macroeco-
nomic” (NOEM) models literature, except that they both feature perfectly compet-
itive markets. Cooley and Quadrini (2003) employ a model in which Home final
goods producers use inputs from both Home and Foreign intermediate goods pro-
ducers, and then consumers in each country only consume the final goods produced
in their own country. Monetary policy in Cooley and Quadrini is a country’s mone-
tary authority choosing a nominal interest rate on a bond that final goods producers
in both countries purchase to finance the intermediate inputs from both countries.
Cooper and Kempf (2003) use a technique that is conceptually different but
structurally similar in which consumers only care about final goods consumption
and that the final goods consumption is an aggregation of a Home produced good
and a Foreign produced good in an OLG setting. Monetary policy in Cooper and
Kempf is a country’s monetary authority choosing a currency growth rate. They
impose two cash-in-advance constraints such that a Home consumer must pay for
Home produced goods in his own currency and he must pay for Foreign produced
goods in the Foreign currency.
In both papers, the standard consumption tax of inflation results. But, in the
two-country setting with international trade, both papers find that the a degree of
monetary market power—derived in Cooley and Quadrini (2003) from some degree
of inelasticity in the demand for both Home and Foreign intermediate goods and
derived in Cooper and Kempf (2003) from a degree of inelasticity in the demand
for Home and Foreign final goods—generates an added benefit to inflation of being
able to appreciate the terms of trade in favor of the inflating country. Cooley and
Quadrini find that this inflationary bias in open economies is actually larger if the
monetary authority cannot commit to a policy.
In a more traditional NOEM paper, Arseneau (2007) uses a model very sim-
ilar to Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) that adds imperfectly competitive firms in each
country. In an environment in which the monetary authority can commit to policy,
Arseneau confirms the inflationary bias of monetary policy result from Cooley and
Quadrini (2003) and Cooper and Kempf (2003). In addition, Arseneau shows that
the degree of imperfect competition can dampen the inflationary bias and can even
fully offset it such that the equilibrium inflation rate is zero or negative. However,
none of the four NOEM papers discussed in the previous paragraphs attempts to an-
swer the question of how the degree of openness in a country affects its equilibrium
7
inflation level when monetary policy is set optimally.
Analogous to the interpretation of the mechanism of the “natural rate” mod-
els but with an opposite result, the following interpretation applies to these NOEM
models with imperfectly competitive firms. In a closed economy, the monetary au-
thority has an incentive to deflate in order to offset the inefficiently high price and
low output level caused by the market power held by firms. However, this degree
of market power is eroded as the country becomes more open and the elasticity of
substitution between Home and Foreign consumption is less than the elasticity of
substitution among the goods of a given country.
The goal of this paper is to use the micro-founded two-country model with
optimal monetary policy in this paper that borrows heavily from the NOEM litera-
ture, instead of following the Mundell-Fleming “natural rate” approach, to try and
match the relationship borne out in the data that openness is negatively correlated
with inflation levels.
1.3 Model
Following Cooper and Kempf (2003), I use a two-country OLG general equilibrium
framework with an independent monetary authority in each country that maximizes
the welfare of its own citizens. In addition, similar to Arseneau (2007), the model
includes imperfectly competitive producers in each country. The model includes no
stochastic shocks and agents enjoy perfect foresight.
I will call the two countries Home and Foreign, which are not relative terms
but are the names of the actual countries. Most of the exposition in this section will
focus on the problem of Home agents and the Home monetary authority, but the
Foreign problem is symmetric in almost every dimension. However, I will allow Home
and Foreign countries to differ in their respective levels of openness to international
trade in a way that I will specify. Within a country, I assume the equilibrium is
symmetric, so I will drop any subscripting of individuals.
This stylized economy is made up of two countries, each of which has a mon-
etary authority, producers, and consumers. The overlapping generations of agents
live for two periods. In the first period of their lives, they produce differentiated
goods in a monopolistically competitive environment and sell the goods to both
Home and Foreign consumers in exchange for the producer’s Home-currency. The
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producers then choose how much of their Home currency to hold and how much of
the Foreign currency to hold given that they will use a portfolio of each respective
currency to consume Home and Foreign goods in the second period of their lives.
The role of each country’s monetary authority is to maximize the lifetime
welfare of the representative agent in the Home country by giving a non-proportional
transfer of Home currency to the consumers of its own country in each period.
Money is held in this economy because it is the only store of value, and changes
in the money supply are not neutral due to the transfers being non-proportional.4
The two cash-in-advance constraints and consumer preferences generate demand for
both currencies by a given consumer.
1.3.1 Money
The objective of the monetary authority in each country, which will be made more
explicit in Section 1.3.4, is to choose a fixed (gross) money growth rate xt = x or
x∗t = x
∗ at the beginning of time in such a way as to maximize the welfare of its
own citizens. I assume here that the monetary authority is committed to its money
growth rate and cannot deviate once it has chosen its money growth path.5
Let Mt and M∗t be the aggregate supply of Home currency and Foreign
currency, respectively, in period t. I normalize the initial supply of Home and
Foreign currency to 1 and divide it equally among the period-1 consumers at the
beginning of the period.












where mh0 and m
f∗
0 are the individual holdings of Home currency by Home con-
sumers and Foreign currency by Foreign consumers, respectively, at the beginning
of period 1. Each country’s monetary authority makes non-proportional transfers of
(x− 1)Mht−1 to each Home consumer in period t and (x∗ − 1)M
f
t−1 to each Foreign
consumer where x and x∗ represent the respective constant gross money growth
rates of each country. So aggregate supply of currency in each country obeys the
4See Azariadis (1981) for a proof that non-proportional monetary transfers are not neutral, even
in a perfect foresight economy.
5The reason to avoid discretionary monetary policy in this paper is due to the resulting char-
acteristic of multiple equilibria as described in Barro and Gordon (1983) and Ireland (1997). See
also King and Wolman (2004) and Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993).
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following laws of motion.
Mt+1 = xMt (1.2)
M∗t+1 = x
∗M∗t (1.3)
This implies that the following relationships for τt+1 and τ∗t+1 represent the non-
proportional transfer to each Home consumer and to each Foreign consumer by
their respective monetary authorities.
τt+1 = (x− 1)Mt (1.4)
τ∗t+1 = (x
∗ − 1)Mt∗ (1.5)
At the end of the first period of their lives, producers make a portfolio decision
of how much of each type of currency to hold. They have just received either
pt(z)nt(z) in Home currency or pt(z∗)nt(z∗) in Foreign currency from the sale of
their differentiated goods. Now, before the end of the first period of life, producers in
each country exchange some of their Home currency balances from sales revenues for
Foreign currency balances at the exchange rate et as shown in the budget constraint
equation (1.27). Let mht and m
f
t represent each Home producer’s portfolio choice
between Home and Foreign currency, respectively, in period t. Because the monetary
authority of each country only transfers currency to its own consumers, the laws of
motion for individual currency balances are the following:
mht+1 = m
h












Because the equilibrium currency holdings within each country are symmet-













t ) held in each country in each period.
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1.3.2 Individuals
A unit measure of agents are born in each period in both the Home country (in-
dexed by z) and the Foreign country (indexed by z∗). In the first period of their
lives, individuals can either enjoy leisure lt or provide labor nt(z) subject to their
endowment of one unit of time.
lt + nt(z) = 1 ∀t, z (1.10)
Each individual also has access to a technology through which she can convert labor
hours into a differentiated good indexed by the individual z for each Home producer
and z∗ for each Foreign producer.6
yt(z) = f (nt(z)) ∀t, z where f (nt(z)) = nt(z) (1.11)
I follow an international variation of the model of monopolistic competition
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).7 I assume that individuals only care about aggregate
consumption, where each Home consumer’s aggregate consumption of Home pro-
duced goods Cht+1 and aggregate Home consumption of Foreign produced goods



















where ε ≥ 0 represents the elasticity of substitution among all the differentiated
goods in country either the Home country or the Foreign country. Symmetric to
the Home consumer, each Foreign consumer’s aggregate consumption of Foreign
produced goods Cf∗t+1 and aggregate Foreign consumption of Home produced goods
6The equilibrium outcomes in Section 1.3.4 and results in Section 1.4 from this structure in
which the imperfect competition is among producers of a differentiated good are equivalent to the
equilibrium outcomes and results in a similar model in which the imperfect competition is among
labor suppliers who provide differentiated labor to identical firms that are perfectly competitive.
7Good example of this type of international monetary model with monopolistic competition are
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Arseneau (2007). Appendix A-4 has a full derivation of the demand
and price functions shown below that result from this monopolistic competition structure.
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Total consumption by each Home and Foreign consumer is further aggre-
gated over her aggregate consumption of Home produced goods and aggregate con-




















































where θh and θf are the Home bias parameters for the Home country and the Foreign
country, respectively, and ρ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between a unit of
Home consumption and a unit of Foreign consumption.8 For the analysis in this
paper, I will assume that the elasticity of substitution between a unit of Home
aggregate consumption and a unit of Foreign aggregate consumption is equal to 1



























The Home and Foreign countries are symmetric in every dimension except for the
Home bias parameters. This assumption seems to fit the empirical evidence that
import shares differ across countries, as shown in Figure 1.1.
This functional form assumption is strong because it forces individuals to
spend a fixed portion of their earnings on consumption of Home-produced goods.
8To be more specific, the parameter space of the two Home bias parameters is {θh, θf} = {0, 0}
or {θh, θf} = {(0, 0.5], (0, 0.5]}.
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However, the general case results in a degenerate equilibrium. The Cobb-Douglas
aggregator has the desirable pedagogical property of allowing for analytical solu-
tions.9 Whatever the specification, a key intuitive relationship is that the elasticity
of substitution among differentiated goods within a country is different from and
greater than the elasticity of substitution between aggregate and Foreign consump-
tion ε > ρ. This is the main source of the international market power a monetary
authority enjoys when a country becomes more open.
The following individual demand and price relationships result from the prob-










































where pt+1(z), P ht+1, and Pt+1 are prices of individual consumption, aggregate
country-specific consumption, and aggregate total consumption, respectively. Anal-
ogous to the derivation for the demand for individual differentiated goods z and
z∗ in (1.20), each Home consumer’s demand for aggregate Home consumption and
aggregate Foreign consumption, respectively, are the following:






9Appendix A-6 provides some of the results of what happens when using the general form of the
CES aggregator.
10The expenditure minimization problem is preferred to the utility maximization problem be-
cause the multiplier on the aggregate consumption constraint in the minimization problem has the










These two equations simply imply that the expenditure on Home aggregate con-
sumption and the expenditure on Foreign aggregate consumption are constant shares
of total expenditure. Another way of putting this is to divide (1.23) by (1.24), which
gives the following relationship that describes the relationship between total expen-













The ratio of total Home consumption to total Foreign consumption is a constant.
That is, θh represents the Home expenditure share on Foreign consumption or the
import share. Equations (1.20) through (1.25) result directly from the Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition structure and from the CES aggregation.11
Individuals seek to maximize lifetime utility derived from disutility of work
in the first period of life in order to sell a differentiated production good for own-
country currency balances that are carried over to the second period of life in which
the individual can spend those balances on consumption of both Home and Foreign
goods. Because the monopolistically competitive producers can set the quantity
demanded by choosing price in order to clear their goods, the consumer’s problem is
characterized by choosing how much to charge for her differentiated good pt(z) and
then the portfolio decision of how much of her sales to keep in the form of Home








u (Ct+1)− g (nt(z))




for σ > 0
and g (nt(z)) = χ (nt(z))
ξ for χ > 0 and ξ ≥ 1
(1.26)
11The CES consumption aggregation in (1.12), (1.13), and (1.18) can also be interpreted as CES
utility over Home and Foreign differentiated goods. Appendix A-5 details the properties of the CES
aggregator.
12An implicit assumption in this setup is that the producer will meet demand, whatever it is.
Thus the producer sets price pt(z) and then produces nt(z) to meet the resulting demand. Some
other interesting cases arise in a model with shocks when producers are not required to meet
demand.
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where (1.27) is the budget constraint reflecting the portfolio decision and (1.28) and
(1.29) are cash-in-advance constraints.
The two cash-in-advance constraints can be thought of as a simplification of
one equilibrium outcome of a richer environment in which governments or monetary
authorities strategically choose what currencies to accept for exchange that takes
place within their borders. Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) present a
random matching search model of money after the flavor of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) in which blocks of agents (countries) choose which currencies to accept for
local and international transactions based on the likelihood of that currency being
accepted in future transactions. In one equilibrium, corresponding to the two cash-
in-advance constraint environment of this paper, each block of agents (country) only
accepts local currency for all local and international transactions.
Another equilibrium in the Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) is the
case in which vendors in both countries accept currency of both countries. This is
analogous to the more standard approach in the NOEM literature as exemplified
by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). Their environment is one characterized by a single
cash-in-advance constraint in which producers sell their goods in both countries and
charge a price in terms of Home currency and a price in terms of Foreign currency.
The exchange rate is then pinned down by an assumption of the law of one price.
The reason for choosing the two cash-in-advance constraints approach as
shown in equations (1.28) and (1.29) instead of the more standard Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001) method of one cash-in-advance constraint and the law of one price
is that the method employed here gives rise to a portfolio decision. The law of
one price is implicit in the two cash-in-advance constraint assumption because, by
definition, vendors only accept one currency and therefore only charge one price.
As will be in Section 1.3.3, the exchange rate here serves as a price that clears
the currency exchange market rather than a mechanism for enforcing the law of one
price. Furthermore, the currency portfolio decision is an interesting one that has not
received much attention.13 However, both the single CIA constraint with the law
13Add some references here to the currency portfolio choice literature, such as Engel and Mat-
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of one price method and the dual CIA constraints with currency exchange market
clearing method deliver the same results for optimal monetary policy.
Using the individual demand equations represented by (1.20), I define the
total demand dt(z) for differentiated Home good z as the sum of the individual
Home and Foreign demands:14







I assume that producers always choose price to maximize utility given their knowl-
edge of total demand dt(z) and then meet the demand.







Using the cash-in-advance constraints (1.28) and (1.29), the money laws of motion
(1.6) and (1.7), and the expressions for the non-proportional transfer in terms of
the Home money growth rate (1.4), country-specific aggregate consumptions can be
expressed in the following way:
Cht+1 =







The expression for Home aggregate total consumption is then:
Ct+1 =
(







Using the portfolio constraint in (1.27) to substitute out either mhi,t or m
f
i,t and sub-
stituting in the expression for labor supply from (1.31), the maximization problem
sumoto (2006) and Evans and Lyons (2005).
























































where equation (1.36) equates the marginal cost of giving up a Home-currency unit
of Home consumption for the marginal benefit of a Home-currency unit of Foreign
consumption. Equation (1.37) equates the marginal benefit of raising price to its
marginal cost in terms of reduced demand, increased utility of leisure, and the
change in income in the next period of life. Because each agent within a country is
identical, other than for a differentiated production good, the resulting individual
equilibrium price pt(z) and the amount of total revenues held in Foreign currency
mft will be symmetric across individuals in a given country.
Notice that the first order condition for mft in (1.36) is equivalent to the
condition (1.25) that results from the two first order conditions in the imperfect
competition expenditure minimization problem. This is because the optimal choice





t + 1. These two decisions are equivalent and take the labor or pricing decision as
given.
1.3.3 Market clearing conditions
This economy has three markets that must clear—the goods market, the money
market, and the exchange market. The following paragraphs describe each market
and the respective market clearing condition.
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Goods Market. Both Home and Foreign consumers demand goods from
both countries. Producers meet that demand by construction in this model. Let
nt(z) represent the amount of production by each Home producer of differentiated
good z. Goods market clearing requires that production equal the sum of all the
Home demands ct(z) and Foreign demands c∗t (z) for differentiated good z.
nt(z) = dt(z) = ct(z) + c∗t (z) ∀ t, z (1.38)
nt(z∗) = dt(z∗) = ct(z∗) + c∗t (z
∗) ∀ t, z∗ (1.39)
where the the right-hand side of each equation is characterized by equation (1.30)
and its Foreign country analogue. This market clearing condition is actually assumed
in the individual maximization stage as shown in (1.31).
Money Market. Money market clearing simply requires that money supply
equal money demand at the time that goods are purchased.
Mt = mht +m
h∗





t ∀ t (1.41)
where Mt and M∗t are the Home and Foreign aggregate money supplies, respectively,
at time t.
Currency Exchange Market. After trade has taken place in the goods
market, period-t producers go to the currency market and make a portfolio decision
of how much of each currency to hold. The exchange rate et is the price that equates
the amount of Foreign currency purchased with Home currency by Home producers







It is important to note that the exchange rate here is not pinned down by the assump-
tion of the law of one price as in models with a single cash-in-advance constraint,
such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Arseneau (2007). Here, the exchange rate
is a price that clears the currency exchange market in period-t. Because of the
two cash-in-advance constraints, the law of one price holds by definition. Using the
cash-in-advance constraint (1.29) and its Foreign country analogue, it can be shown
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that exchange rate market clearing implies that the nominal value of imports equals











This perfect foresight overlapping generations model has one unique nonautarkic
steady state equilibrium. As noted in Section 1.3.1, I avoid discretionary monetary
policy in this paper due to the resulting characteristic of multiple equilibria, most of
which are unstable sunspot equilibria characterized by expectations traps.15 Table
1.1 shows the conditions that must hold in a perfect foresight equilibrium. I define
the steady state international equilibrium given both Home and Foreign monetary
policy (x, x∗) as follows:
Definition 1.1 (Steady State International Equilibrium given x and x∗).
A steady state international equilibrium, given Home and Foreign monetary policy
(x, x∗) is the set of Home consumption of both Home and Foreign aggregate goods
Ch and Cf , Home production n, Home portfolio holdings of both Home and Foreign
currency mh and mf (or rather, as a percentage of initial Home holdings, φ and 1−
φ), the Foreign counterparts (Ch∗, Cf∗, n∗,mh∗,mf∗), individual Home and Foreign
prices pt(z) and pt(z∗), and exchange rate et such that:
• Individual optimization: Home and Foreign agents choose the price level
of their differentiated good as well as their currency portfolio holdings in order
to maximize lifetime utility in (1.26) and its Foreign counterpart subject to a
budget constraint (1.27) and two cash-in-advance constraints (1.28) and (1.29).
• Market Clearing The goods markets (1.38) and (1.39), money markets (1.40)
and (1.41), and currency exchange market (1.42) all clear.
Following Cooper and Kempf (2003), let φt represent the share of revenues
pt(z)nt(z) kept in the form of Home currency in period t, and let 1−φt be the share
of revenues exchanged for Foreign currency as characterized in the portfolio budget
15Ireland (1997) and King and Wolman (2004) are good references on multiple equilibria in models
of discretionary monetary policy, which builds on the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983). See also Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993).
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Table 1.1: Equilibrium conditions given x and x∗













































































































(1.38) nt(z) = ct(z) + c∗t (z)
(1.39) nt(z∗) = ct(z∗) + c∗t (z
∗)
(1.40) Mt = mht + m
h∗
t










constraint (1.27). Then the following expressions hold.
pt(z)nt(z)−mht = etm
f




= (1− φ∗t )M∗t (1.45)






∗ − 1)M∗t (1.47)
Plugging (1.44), (1.45), (1.46), and (1.47) into the first order condition (1.36)
and its Foreign country analogue, the unique nonautarkic steady state equilibrium
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share of currency from sales held for own-country consumption is given by:




























From the aggregate money laws of motion in (1.2) and (1.3) and from the
money market clearing conditions in (1.40) and (1.41), it is clear that the non-







Furthermore, using the definition of the Home country CPI level Pt+1 from (1.22)
and its Foreign country analogue, the expressions for the share Home country rev-
enues traded for Foreign currency balances (1.49) and the share of Foreign country
revenues traded for Home currency balances (1.51), and the currency exchange mar-
ket clearing condition (1.42), the Home country CPI growth rate and the Foreign








Using (1.48), (1.49), (1.50), and (1.51), as well as the equilibrium inflation
rates from (1.52) and (1.53), equilibrium consumption can be derived in terms of
16The derivation is given in Derivation 4 in Appendix A-3.
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steady state employment from the cash-in-advance constraints as:
Ch = (1− θh)n (1.56)
Cf = θfn∗ (1.57)
Cf∗ = (1− θf )n∗ (1.58)
Ch∗ = θhn (1.59)
where the steady state employment levels n and n∗ are characterized below in equa-
tions (1.62) and (1.63).
The expressions for the steady state international equilibrium employment is
then found by solving the two equilibrium forms of the Home first order condition
















[(1− θf )n∗](1−θf )(1−σ)−1 [θhn]θf (1−σ) = χξ(n∗)ξ−1 (1.61)
Solving (1.61) for n∗ and plugging it into (1.60), and doing the symmetric operation
for the Foreign country gives the expressions for Home and Foreign equilibrium labor
supply:










where the symbols in (1.62) and (1.63) summarize the parameters of the model in
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∆h (−) always (+) when σ > 1
∆f (−) always (+) when σ > 1
Σh (−) when σ > 1 and θh > 0 (−) when σ > 1
Σf (−) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1
Ωh (+) when θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (+) when σ > 1 and θh > 0
Ωf (+) when θh > 0 (+) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1 and θh > 0
∆h∆f − ΣhΣf (+) always (−) when σ > 1 (−) when σ > 1
Note: The results from this table are derived in Derivation 5 in Appendix A-3.
the following way:
∆h = (1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ (1.64)
∆f = (1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ (1.65)
Σh = θh(1− σ) (1.66)



























The signs of these expressions and their derivatives with respect to the openness
parameters θh and θf are given in Table 1.2. From the signs of the representative
parameters, it is clear that steady state equilibrium Home employment n decreases
in x always and increases in x∗ when σ > 1.
Looking at the equation for Home labor supply in (1.62), the sign of Σh de-
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termines how Foreign monetary policy affects the real economy in the Home country.
Σh =

> 0 if θh ∈ (0, 0.5] and σ ∈ (0, 1)
= 0 if θh = 0 or σ = 1
< 0 if θ ∈ (0, 0.5] and σ > 1
(1.72)
The third case is the most common in which Σh < 0, implying that Foreign inflation
causes an increase in the equilibrium level of Home production and, therefore, an
increase in equilibrium consumption of the Home good by both Home and Foreign
consumers.
If one were to make the strong assumption that the coefficient of relative
risk aversion σ were less than one, the first case in (1.72) occurs in which Foreign
inflation causes a decrease in the equilibrium level of Home production. Lastly, it is
interesting to notice the cases in which Foreign monetary policy has no real effect
on the Home country (Σ = 0). Obviously, when the economies do not trade with
each other, θh = 0, Foreign monetary policy will be neutral. But it is interesting to
note that the case of log utility (σ = 1) also induces the real neutrality of Foreign
monetary policy.
The monetary authority in each country seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
of a representative agent in this economy by choosing Home monetary policy x given
Foreign monetary policy x∗. Define V (x, x∗) as the lifetime utility of a representative
agent. The objective of the Home monetary authority is then:
max
x
V (x, x∗) = max
x
(




− χn (x, x∗)ξ
(1.73)
Definition 1.2 (Home Country Steady State Monetary Equilibrium). A
Home country steady state monetary equilibrium is a function for the optimal Home
money growth rate x̂ (x∗) given the Foreign money growth rate such that:
• the individual steady state equilibrium conditions from Definition 1.1 hold for
each country,
• the Home monetary authority chooses x to maximize the lifetime utility of the
representative agent of its country as in equation (1.73).
Definition 1.2 can be thought of as a monetary partial equilibrium in a world
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monetary environment because it implies a best response function for Home mon-
etary policy that is a function of any level of Foreign monetary policy. Taking the













(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θh)ξ
(1.74)













(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θf )ξ
(1.75)
The first characteristic to note about the optimal Home monetary policy
function in (1.74) is that it is independent of Foreign monetary policy x∗. That is,
the optimal level of the Home money growth rate does not change with changes in
the Foreign money growth rate and is a dominant strategy equilibrium.18
This dominant strategy equilibrium is shown in Figure 1.2 which plots the
lifetime utility of a representative Home agent from (1.73) as a function of Home
inflation x and Foreign inflation x∗. The parameters (θ, σ, ε, χ, ξ) are simply chosen
to reflect values estimated in the empirical literature in order to make a simple
example. The dark line running across the top of Figure 1.2 represents the Home
monetary policy best response function from (1.74). The optimal Home inflation
level at the selected parameter values is a constant x̂ = 1.56, which is not overly
high given that the duration of a period is a generation. Because each country’s best
response function for monetary policy is a dominant strategy equilibrium, the world
Nash monetary equilibrium is the same as the country partial monetary equilibrium.
17See Derivation 6 in Appendix A-3.
18Derivation 6 in Appendix A-3 details why x̂ is independent of x∗.
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Figure 1.2: Home lifetime utility V as a function of x and x∗
θh = 0.35,  σ = 3,  ε = 10,  χ = 0.5,  ξ = 2 
 




























Before moving on to the results from Section 1.3.4, it is instructive to highlight the
two frictions present in this model—money and imperfect competition—and their
interplay with the level of openness. The two frictions are most easily isolated in a
closed economy when the other friction is shut down. The inefficiencies caused by
these two frictions are manifested in this setting as the “labor wedge” outlined in
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007).19 The efficient allocation is found by solving
the planner’s problem of maximizing the utility of the period-t old from consumption
minus the disutility of labor of the period-t young in the closed economy case θh = 0,








s.t. Cht = nt
(1.76)
The planner’s solution steady state equilibrium is the following:
(Cps, nps) : u′(Ch) = g′(n) (1.77)
The deviation from the planner’s solution created by the presence of imper-
fect competition is isolated by looking at the closed economy decentralized steady
state solution where θh = 0 in which the money growth rate is fixed at x = 1. The
first order condition in (1.37) can be written as:
(Cic, nic) : u′(C) = Φg′(n) (1.78)
where Φ = εε−1 ≥ 1 and (1.78) represents that marginal utility of consumption equals
a markup over marginal cost. The monopoly power enjoyed by firms resulting from
the imperfect substitutability ε of their goods allows producers to raise prices above
the efficient level and lower output in order to maximize profits. Thus, (Cic, nic) 
(Cps, nps), and (Cic, nic) decreases as the degree imperfect competition Φ increases
(as ε decreases).
19However, a key point on which this paper differs from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) is
that money is set optimally in this paper and not stochastic. But Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) do conclude that the labor-wedge channel does explain much of the observed variation in
business cycles.
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In like manner, the deviation from the planner’s solution created by the
money growth rate is isolated by looking at the closed economy decentralized steady
state solution where θh = 0 in which producers are perfectly competitive ε = ∞




u′(C) = g′(n) (1.79)
Equation (1.79) highlights the reason why expansionary monetary policy is thought
of as an inflation tax. For higher money growth rates, the marginal benefit of an
extra unit of labor decreases. Another way of looking at this problem is that the
marginal productivity of labor is equal to 1, given the linear production technology.
But the real wage in the closed economy is 1x . So for any money growth rate greater
than 1, the real wage is less than the marginal productivity of labor. The result is
that labor supplied is inefficiently low and (Cmp, nmp)  (Cps, nps) for all x > 1.
Conversely, (Cmp, nmp)  (Cps, nps) for all x < 1. If the money growth rate is set
optimally, the first best policy is x = 1 in this closed economy setting.
The interplay between openness, monetary policy and imperfect competi-
tion is seen when the closed economy frictions described preceding paragraphs are
compared to their open economy counterparts. In the closed economy above, any
money growth rate greater than the inverse of the markup gives a leisure subsidy
that is dominated by an inflation tax, both of which are borne entirely by the agents
of the closed country. However, when the two countries are open (θh, θf > 0), the
inflation tax imposed by increasing the money growth rate is no longer borne solely
by Home agents. Furthermore, increased money growth by the Home monetary
authority actually increases the real wage through the terms of trade appreciation
and increased preference weight on Foreign consumption. This added benefit of
Home money growth is due to the international monopoly power of the Home mon-
etary authority derived from the degree of inelastic demand fo imports by Foreign
consumers.20
From the expressions for Home and Foreign employment in (1.62) and (1.63),
the Home leisure subsidy results from the negative effect of an increase in x and
the Foreign leisure tax results from the positive effect of an increase in x. The
20Recall that the constant expenditure share principle derives from the first order condition of
the utility with the Cobb-Douglas aggregate consumption.
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consumption tax of inflation can be seen by taking the derivative of equilibrium
Home aggregate consumption C and Foreign aggregate consumption with respect
to x.
C = [(1− θh)n]1−θh [θfn∗]θh
= (1− θh)1−θhθθhf
(1− θh)(1−θh)(1−σ)θθh(1−σ)f













C∗ = [(1− θf )n∗]1−θf [θhn]θf
= (1− θf )1−θf θ
θf
h














The exponents on x in both (1.80) and (1.81) are both negative, but the exponent
on x in (1.80) is larger in absolute value. That is, an increase in the Home money
growth rate will cause a decrease in both the Home aggregate consumption C and
Foreign aggregate consumption C∗, but the decrease in C is greater than the decrease
in C∗. This latter fact is seen more clearly when steady state equilibrium relative





(1− θf )(1−θf )θ
θf
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The exponent on the bracketed term is negative, so an increase in xmakes C decrease
more than C∗. Thus, the inflation tax in the open economy is not just a decrease
in equilibrium Home aggregate consumption C as in the closed economy case, but
also a decrease in Foreign aggregate consumption C∗ and an increase in Foreign
employment n∗.
As was mentioned earlier, the Home leisure subsidy is the only benefit of
inflation in the open economy that also exists in the closed economy. However, in
contrast to the decrease in the real wage in a closed economy, an increase in the
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Home money growth rate x increases the real wage in the open economy setting.
The real wage in the open economy is the extra aggregate consumption from an
extra unit of labor. Thus, the Home real wage is the derivative of Home aggregate

















Because the exponent on the bracketed term is negative, the effect of an increase in
the Home money growth rate x is to increase the real wage. On the other hand, an
increase in the Foreign money growth rate x∗ is to decrease the real wage due to
the positive effect of x∗ on n.
This real-wage benefit of Home inflation is driven by two components. First,
as has been documented by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Cooley and Quadrini (2003),
Cooper and Kempf (2003), and Arseneau (2007), an increase in the Home money
growth rate x causes the terms of trade to appreciate in favor of the Home country.
The terms of trade for a given country is defined as the price of its exports in terms
of its imports. In the steady state equilibrium, the terms of trade for the Home

















Again, because the exponent on the bracketed term is negative, the effect of an
increase in the Home money growth rate x is to increase the cost of Home exports
in terms of Home imports. On the other hand, an increase in the Foreign money
growth rate x∗ is to decrease the terms of trade. The second component of the real-
wage benefit of Home inflation is simply that increased openness means that more
weight is placed on Foreign consumption which is amplified by the terms-of-trade
appreciation.
So the objective of the Home monetary authority is to set its money growth
rate such that the benefits of the inflation caused by x (leisure subsidy and real-wage
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benefit) equal the costs (consumption tax). The real-wage benefit is a direct result
of the monopoly power that the monetary authority enjoys in international markets.
And this monopoly power derives from the degree of inelastic demand for Foreign
goods, as shown in the first order condition for Foreign currency balances (1.36).
Lastly, looking at the expression for the optimal Home money growth rate x
in (1.74), it is no surprise that as the degree of imperfect competition increases in the
Home country, the country-specific welfare benefits that the monetary authority can
obtain from increasing the money growth rate decrease. Intuitively, the monopoly
rents from the imperfect competition structure replace the monopoly rents obtained
by the monetary authority through increasing the money growth rate.
1.4 Results
The main question of this paper is whether openness is inflationary. The following
proposition answers this question with regard to both absolute inflation rate (Home
country CPI growth rate) and what I will define as relative inflation rate (Home
country CPI growth rate over Foreign country CPI growth rate) or a real exchange
rate.
Proposition 1.1 (Monetary response to changes in openness). The equi-
librium optimal Home money growth rate x̂ in (1.74) increases with more Home
openness in the form of a higher level of θh and in response to more Foreign open-
ness in the form of a higher level of θf . The argument for the Foreign country is
symmetric. However, when θh increases, the increase in x̂ is greater than the in-
crease in x̂∗. Conversely, when θf increases, the increase in x̂∗ is greater than the
increase in x̂.
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
Because the Home country CPI growth rate (Pt+1/Pt) is equal to the Home
money growth rate x, an increase in θh increases Home country inflation as well as
Foreign country inflation. From the perspective of the Home monetary authority,
if the Home marginal utility of Home consumption decreases relative to the Home
marginal utility of Foreign consumption as is the case when θh increases while θf
remains constant (see first order condition (1.37)), Home country agents bear a
smaller proportion of the inflation tax. In effect, higher θh increases the welfare
benefits from higher money growth rates to the Home country and lowers the costs.
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Consequently, the optimal response by the Home monetary authority is to raise the
Home money growth rate or the CPI inflation rate in response to a higher degree of
openness.
The next two propositions further explain how the level of imperfect competi-
tion among producers in a country, as parameterized by the elasticity of substitution
among a country’s differentiated goods ε, influences the optimal money growth rate
x and the real outcomes of the economy in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2 (Deflationary bias of imperfect competition). Both the op-
timal Home money growth rate x̂ and the optimal Foreign money growth rate x̂∗
decrease as the level of imperfect competition increases (as ε decreases). Further-
more, there exist two critical within-country elasticities of substitution for the Home
country and Foreign country (ε̄, ε̄∗) such that x̂ = 1 when ε = ε̄ and x̂∗ = 1 when
ε = ε̄∗. That is, these two critical levels of the imperfect competition parameter
implement the Friedman Rule in the Home and Foreign country, respectively.
ε̄ =
(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
θh(1− σ − ξ)
(1.85)
ε̄∗ =
(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
θf (1− σ − ξ)
(1.86)
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
This result that the level imperfect competition induces a deflationary bias in mon-
etary policy has been shown recently by Arseneau (2007).
Lastly, Proposition 1.3 highlights the relationship between the level of market
power held by producers within a country and the monopoly power held by the each
monetary authority in international markets.
Proposition 1.3 (Market power neutrality). In the case of symmetric countries
θh = θf , the steady state equilibrium levels of employment n and n∗ are not affected
by the level of imperfect competition ε within both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
Proposition 1.3 says that the real outcomes in each country (n, n∗, Ch, Cf , Ch∗, Cf∗)
are the same regardless of whether the countries are characterized by perfect com-
petition ε = ∞ or whether any degree of monopoly power is enjoyed by producers
ε < ∞. The implication of this result is that if any monopoly rents available to
Home or Foreign agents are not collected through producer price setting, the re-
mainder will be collected by the monetary authority raising prices. As stated in
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Proposition 1.2, a level of imperfect competition exists at which all the monopoly
rents are collected through producer price setting along. That is, inflation generated
by the monetary authority increasing the money growth rate is not needed.
These results provide an interesting interpretation of the empirical findings
summarized in Figure 1.1. If one is looking at the negative relationship between
openness and inflation from the entire sample predicted values, Propositions 1.1
through 1.3 suggest that the inflationary bias of openness is dominated by the defla-
tionary bias of imperfect competition. That is, the level of imperfect competition is
greater than the critical value at which optimal monetary policy causes zero inflation
(ε < ε̄, ε̄∗). On the other hand, if one is looking at the positive relationship between
openness and inflation that results when looking at low-inflation countries, the con-
clusion is that the inflationary bias of openness slightly dominates the deflationary
bias of imperfect competition.
1.5 Conclusion
The main result of this work is that increased openness, as defined by the import
share of GDP, is associated with a higher level of steady state equilibrium inflation.
In a closed economy, the leisure subsidy of inflation is strictly dominated by the
consumption tax, so the only role for the optimal money growth rate is to offset
the inefficiencies of imperfect competition. However, as a country becomes more
open, more of the burden of the consumption tax of inflation is borne by Foreign
consumers, and the terms of trade and the real wage appreciate with increased
inflation. These extra benefits from higher money growth rates cause an inflationary
effect of openness in equilibrium.
However, another important finding of this paper is that, not only does the
level of imperfect competition among producers in a given country dampen the
incentive for a monetary authority to increase the money growth rate, but is a
perfect substitute. That is, any monopoly rents that are available to the agents of
a country that are not collected through price setting behavior of producers derived
from the level of imperfect competition within the country are extracted by the
monetary authority.
The result that openness is inflationary runs contrary to much previous work
that has documented a negative correlation between various measures of the level
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of globalization or openness and inflation. However, much less work exists that
explores this relationship through structural international models based on microe-
conomic foundations. This work is a first pass at studying, specifically, the imperfect
competition and monetary market power channel.
Further work includes relaxing the strong assumption that the elasticity of
substitution between aggregate Home-produced consumption and aggregate Foreign-
produced consumption is unity ρ = 1, which results in the Cobb-Douglas form of the
final consumption aggregator. Relaxing this assumption would break the constant
expenditure share result and allow consumers to substitute away from expenditures
on a country’s production when the monetary authority raises the money growth
rate. This may also break the dominant strategy equilibrium result in which the
optimal monetary policy of each country is independent of the policy of the other
country. Other extensions that may break the dominant strategy equilibrium result
are to add pricing or exchange rate frictions such as time- or state-dependent pricing
or pricing-to-market.
Also, this paper assumes that the two countries are asymmetric with respect
to the level of openness θ. However, another dimension of asymmetry that might be
interesting is the elasticity of substitution ε that parameterizes the level of imperfect
competition. Furthermore, a vein of the literature exists that studies environments
with endogenous markups in which the elasticity of substitution changes as firms
enter and exit.21
And lastly, if the degree of openness has such important effects on the ability
of the monetary authority to extract monopoly rents for its citizens, then how would
an entity like a congressional body set openness policy optimally if it could? That
is, what would be the equilibrium outcomes with endogenous openness θ?








The nebulous term “globalization” is most often used to describe the increased
economic integration of countries in the last 30 years. In making that term more
specific, many branches of the international economics literature have studied ques-
tions about the effects of a countries openness on various economic outcomes. The
goal of this paper is to provide evidence on the effect of openness on inflation.
First, I provide a theoretical model that illustrates a channel through which
increase openness of a country to international trade can increase equilibrium infla-
tion in that country. This positive effect of openness on inflation depends critically
on the level of imperfect competition, both within countries and on the international
market. Because domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, a monetary
authority can export some of the inflation tax of money growth to foreign holders of
their currency. In effect, a monetary authority enjoys a degree of monopoly power
in international markets due to foreign holders of the domestic currency and some
degree of inelasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption.
However, this inflationary incentive is dampened by the degree of imperfect
competition within the country. The intuition is that some rents exist in the in-
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ternational marketplace, and that the private holders of monopoly power within a
country will obtain as much of those rents as possible given the level of imperfect
competition in that country. And whatever portion of those rents are left over is
taken by the monetary authority through its policy instrument.
In Section 2.2, I present the model. It is a two-country overlapping genera-
tions (OLG) model with imperfectly competitive labor markets, a monetary author-
ity in each country that chooses a money growth rate to maximize the welfare of its
citizens, and in which domestic and foreign consumption are imperfect substitutes.
This model draws from Cooper and Kempf (2003) who use a two-country OLG
model with perfectly competitive markets within each country, optimal monetary
authorities, and imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign goods to answer the
question of when currency unions are optimal. However, one implicit result of their
work is that increased openness is inflationary.
I follow the method of modeling imperfect competition within each country
from Arseneau (2007) who uses a two-country infinite horizon model with imper-
fectly competitive goods markets, optimal monetary policy, and imperfectly substi-
tutable domestic and foreign consumption goods to study the effects of imperfect
competition on inflation in a multi-country environment. He finds that the increased
imperfect competition (less competition) has a negative effect on equilibrium infla-
tion rates. However, rather than model the degree of openness of a country, Arseneau
(2007) models the size of a country. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) use a similar model
with stochastic money growth.
However, none of the above papers directly study the question of openness
and inflation.1 The fundamental theoretical underpinnings of this question come
from Rogoff (1985), who uses a two-country adaptation of Barro and Gordon (1983)
to illustrate a channel through which increased openness decreases equilibrium in-
flation. In a closed economy Barro-Gordon setting, the well known time-consistency
problem generates a situation of suboptimally high inflation and employment and
output at their natural rates. However, when the country becomes open to inter-
national trade, the time-consistent inflationary incentive of the monetary authority
decreases because of its adverse effect on foreign demand for domestically produced
goods.
1Evans (2007) and Wynne and Kersting (2007) provide summaries of the literature on openness
and inflation.
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The channel that I model is different from Rogoff (1985) in two major ways.
First, I model optimal monetary policy in the simplest possible way—commitment
to a constant money growth rate in order to maximize country welfare. This is
merely a simplifying assumption instead of time-consistent monetary policy because
the goal is not the effect of monetary policy but rather the effect of openness on
inflation in the presence of optimal monetary policy. The second major difference
is the structure of demand on international markets. Rogoff (1985) implicitly as-
sumes that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, whereas I allow some
degree of inelasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. This is the
key characteristic that generates the beggar-thy-neighbor incentive for a monetary
authority to inflate in an international setting.2
In Section 2.3, I present some empirical tests of the effect of openness on
inflation. The empirical methods of this paper follow Romer (1993). He tested
the theoretical prediction of Rogoff (1985), by running regressions of a proxy for
openness (average import share of GDP) on the average inflation rate for a sample
of 114 countries over the period from 1973 to 1987. Across a number of different
specifications, Romer found a robust negative relationship between openness and
inflation. His result was further confirmed in follow-up studies by Lane (1997) and
Terra (1998).
The striking result that comes from the empirical estimates in this paper is
that the sign of the effect of openness on inflation becomes positive when looking
at a the later sample period from 1988 to 2002. Another innovation of this paper
in the empirical openness and inflation literature is that I control for the level
of imperfect competition within each country. Using limited manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing markup data from Høj, Jimenez, Maher, Nicoletti, and Wise
(2007) and using more broadly available union membership rates and union coverage
rates data, I include these proxies for countrywide imperfect competition levels as
controls in the regression.
I find that the empirical tests in this paper provide supporting evidence of the
prediction of my theoretical model that increased openness can result in increased
inflation. This is not to make a normative statement that openness to international
2This international market power story fits well with the current situation in which the dollar
is the most widely held currency in the world, and that this monopoly power allows the United
States to maintain a large budget deficit.
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trade is negative. Rather, the findings of this paper illustrate in more detail the
costs and benefits to openness to international trade.
2.2 Model
The model in this section uses a two-country overlapping generations framework
similar to Cooper and Kempf (2003). However, I add imperfectly competitive labor
markets within each country following Arseneau (2007) and Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001). However, the imperfect competition in this model is in the labor market
rather than the goods producing market. Each country has a continuum of perfectly
competitive firms that produce by hiring the differentiated labor at a contracted
wage. Each country also has a monetary authority that commits to a constant
money growth rate at the beginning of time in order to maximize the welfare of the
citizens of its own country.
2.2.1 Money
The optimal monetary policy structure of this model is the simplest possible form.
Money is held because it is the only store of value, and I assume that the monetary
authority must commit to a constant money growth rate at the beginning of time.
Money in this model is not neutral because of a price rigidity arising from wage con-
tracts. The consumption tax levied by money growth in a steady state equilibrium
reflects the expected increased deterioration of purchasing power over time on the
part of consumers.
The objective of the monetary authority in each country, which will be made
more explicit in Section 2.2.5, is to choose a fixed (gross) money growth rate xt = x
or x∗t = x
∗ at the beginning of time in such a way as to maximize the welfare of its
own citizens. I assume here that the monetary authority is committed to its money
growth rate and cannot deviate once it has chosen its money growth path.3 Money
is held because it is the only store of value, and monetary policy is not neutral in
the steady state because it drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
3This is the simplest possible optimal monetary policy structure. The reason to avoid discre-
tionary monetary policy in this paper is due to the resulting characteristic of multiple equilibria as
shown in Ireland (1997). See also King and Wolman (2004) and Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar
(1993).
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and the real wage.4
Let Mt and M∗t be the aggregate supply of Home currency and Foreign
currency, respectively, in period t. I normalize the initial supply of Home and
Foreign currency to 1 and divide it equally among the period-1 consumers at the
beginning of the period.












The variables mh0 and m
f∗
0 are the individual holdings of Home currency by Home
consumers and Foreign currency by Foreign consumers, respectively, at the begin-
ning of period 1. Each country’s monetary authority makes non-proportional trans-
fers of (x − 1)Mht−1 to each Home consumer in period t and (x∗ − 1)M
f
t−1 to each
Foreign consumer where x and x∗ represent the respective constant gross money
growth rates of each country. So aggregate supply of currency in each country
obeys the following laws of motion.
Mt+1 = xMt (2.2)
M∗t+1 = x
∗M∗t (2.3)
This implies that the following relationships for τt+1 and τ∗t+1 represent the non-
proportional transfer to each Home consumer and to each Foreign consumer by
their respective monetary authorities.
τt+1 = (x− 1)Mt (2.4)
τ∗t+1 = (x
∗ − 1)M∗t (2.5)
At the end of the first period of their lives, workers make a portfolio deci-
sion of how much of each type of currency to hold. They have just received wages
represented by either pt(z)nt(z) in Home currency or pt(z∗)nt(z∗) in Foreign cur-
rency for their differentiated labor hired by the identical firms in their own country.
Before the end of the first period of life, workers in each country exchange some of
their wages in own-country currency balances for other-country currency balances
at the exchange rate et as shown in the budget constraint equation (2.17). Let mht
4Intuitively, increased money growth taxes the purchasing power of the only store of value, which
causes agents to take more leisure in the first period of their lives.
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and mft represent each Home worker’s portfolio choice between Home and Foreign
currency, respectively, in period t. Because the monetary authority of each coun-
try only transfers currency to its own consumers, the laws of motion for individual
currency balances are the following:
mht+1 = m
h




























held in each country in each period.
2.2.2 Firms
The Home and Foreign country each have a unit measure of identical infinitely
lived firms that produce a consumption good yt and y∗t , respectively, each period.
Within each country, the firms are perfectly competitive as characterized by a zero
profit condition and can be treated as a single representative firm. The elasticity
of substitution between Home and Foreign goods is given by the parameter ρ ≥ 0,
which enters into individual preferences described in Section 2.2.3.5
The representative firm in each country produces a final good yt using differ-
entiated labor nt(z) from its own country, where z ∈ [0, 1] indexes the type of labor.
5For most of this paper, I assume that ρ = 1, which results in a Cobb-Douglas aggregator or
utility function as shown in Equation 2.21. Appendix A-5 shows the general case of CES preferences
in which ρ ≥ 0 and shows some of its limiting values such as Leontief preferences (ρ = 0), Cobb-
Douglas preferences (ρ = 1), and perfect substitutes (ρ = ∞).
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where ε ≥ 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among all the differentiated
types of labor available to the firm in a given country.7
Note here that the imperfect competition is not on the part of firms. Instead,
the suppliers of labor will possess the market power. However, a similar model
used by Evans (2007) places the imperfect competition on the part of differentiated
intermediate goods producers, and the results do not change.
The representative firm maximizes profits πt by choosing how much of each
type of labor within its own country nt(z) to hire in order to produce yt units of
the final consumption good given a market selling price for the good P ht and the
negotiated wages for each of the different types of labor wt(z). Substituting the















wt(z)nt(z) dz ∀ t (2.12)






yt ∀ t, z (2.13)
6The CES production function was first introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow
(1961) and was extended to the n-input case by Uzawa (1962) and McFadden (1963). The idea
of the differentiated inputs resulting in imperfect competition was then formalized by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). The difference here is that the good produced in each country is a composite of the
differentiated inputs rather than aggregate consumption being a composite of differentiated goods
consumption.
7This is analogous to a situation in which firms can hire CEOs, accountants, and janitors. Each
is an imperfect substitute for the other. I have assumed that the elasticities of substitution among
differentiated labor types in the two countries are equal ε = ε∗ ≥ 0. However, this assumption does
not change the sign of the effect of openness on inflation. Furthermore, the elasticity must satisfy
ε ≥ 1 because any ε ∈ [0, 1) implies a negative markup at which a firm would not produce.
8See Derivation 2 in Appendix A-3.
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The expression for the price level of the consumption good P ht is pinned down by








The expression for an aggregate Home-country consumer price level Pt as a function
of the price of Home-produced consumption P ht and Foreign-produced consumption












where et is the exchange rate.10
2.2.3 Individuals
A unit measure of agents is born in each period in both the Home country (indexed
by z) and the Foreign country (indexed by z∗). Each generation of agents lives
for two periods. They work in the first period, and consume in the second period.
From this point forward, I will show the problem of a Home-country agent. But the
problem of a Foreign country agent is symmetric.
In the first period of their lives, individuals can either enjoy leisure lt or
provide labor nt(z) subject to their endowment of one unit of time.
lt + nt(z) = 1 ∀t, z (2.16)
Labor is not mobile across countries. Labor markets are imperfectly competitive in
this model because each worker’s labor is differentiated from that of all the other
workers, analogous to Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) differentiated goods model. As
was shown in the firm production functions in equations (2.10) and (2.11) each
differentiated type of labor is imperfectly substitutable among the other types of
labor available within a given country for producing the homogeneous country-
specific consumption good.
At the beginning of the first period of life, an individual knows the monetary
9See Derivation 3 in Appendix A-3.
10See equation (??) in Appendix A-4 for derivation.
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policy of both the Home and Foreign country (x, x∗), the aggregate money supply
in each country (Mt,M∗t ), the labor demand functions for own-country firms (2.13),
and the resulting pricing equations in each country (2.14). Because individuals in
the first period of life know the firm’s labor demand function (2.13) and because
these workers can set their wage contract at the beginning of the period, labor
supply equals labor demand. That is, because changes in an individual’s amount
of labor supplied and contracted wage do not affect the amount of country-specific
output and price level, respectively, the choice of wage level determines the labor
supply amount.11
Once the wage wt(z) has been contracted between each worker and the firm,
each worker supplies labor nt(z), and the representative firm produces the amount
yt of the country-specific consumption good according to the Dixit-Stiglitz CES pro-
duction technology in (2.10). The firm then sells its output to consumers from both
the Home and Foreign countries who have had their currency balances augmented
by the non-proportional transfers from their respective monetary authorities. Firms
then take these revenues in their own country’s currency and pay their workers
according to the contracted wage rate.12 At the end of the period, workers take
their earnings in their own-country currency and decide how much of it to trade for
foreign currency balances:
wt(z)nt(z) = mht + etm
f
t (2.17)
where et is the exchange rate.
In the second period of life, the workers become consumers. They receive
the non-proportional transfer from the monetary authority τt+1 and they spend











where cht+1 and c
f
t+1 are the consumption of Home and Foreign goods, respectively,
11See Appendix A-1 for proof.
12These wage contracts are only considered a price friction in a stochastic or time-consistent
monetary policy environment. Wage contracts are not a price friction in this perfect foresight,
policy-commitment environment.
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by a Home country agent. The prices of the Home and Foreign goods in terms of
their respective currencies are P ht+1 and P
f
t+1. The timing of this model is illustrated
in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Timing of two-country OLG model
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Lifetime utility of a Home-country agent is defined as an additively separable
function over an aggregate consumption basket ct+1 and labor nt(z):
U (ct+1, nt(z)) = u (ct+1)− g (nt(z))




for σ > 0
and g (nt(z)) = χ (nt(z))
ξ for χ > 0 and ξ ≥ 1
(2.20)
where σ represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and χ and ξ are the level
and shape parameters, respectively, of the function for the disutility of labor. Indi-
vidual aggregate consumption ct+1 is defined as a Cobb-Douglas constant elasticity















where cht+1 is individual consumption of the Home-produced good by the Home
agent, cft+1 is individual consumption of the Foreign-produced good by the Home
agent and θh is the home bias parameter. Because θh reflects the preference weight-
ing that Home consumers place on Foreign consumption, it characterizes the degree
of openness of the Home country.13
The Home consumer’s demand for Home-produced and Foreign-produced
consumption can be derived from the consumer’s expenditure minimization problem
in the second period of life, given the prices of Home-produced consumption P ht+1 and
Foreign-produced consumption P ft+1 and given the level of aggregate consumption
ct+1.14















Note that these consumption demand equations are analogous to the differentiated
labor input demand equations in (2.13), except that they include the home-bias
parameter. Also note that dividing (2.22) by (2.23) gives the constant expendi-
ture share equation from the first order condition in (2.29). This simply because
the demand equations from expenditure minimization and utility maximization are
equivalent.
The objective of each individual in the Home country can be represented as
a choice of a contracted wage rate wt(z) and a currency portfolio decision mht and
13Foreign consumers’ degree of openness θf is not forced to be symmetric to the Home consumers’
parameter. As will be shown later, θh is a good way to parameterize the degree of openness because
it equals the import share in equilibrium, which has been a proxy for openness in many previous
empirical studies (e.g., Romer (1993), Lane (1997), and Terra (1998)).
14See equations (A.4.22) and (A.4.23) in Appendix A-4 for derivation.
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− χ (nt(z))ξ (2.24)













where (2.17) is the budget constraint reflecting the portfolio decision and (2.18) and
(2.19) are the cash-in-advance constraints.
The two cash-in-advance constraints can be thought of as a simplification of
one equilibrium outcome of a richer environment in which governments or monetary
authorities strategically choose what currencies to accept for exchange that takes
place within their borders. Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) present a
random matching search model of money after the flavor of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) in which blocks of agents (countries) choose which currencies to accept for
local and international transactions based on the likelihood of that currency being
accepted in future transactions. In one equilibrium, corresponding to the two cash-
in-advance constraint environment of this paper, each block of agents (country) only
accepts local currency for all local and international transactions.
Another equilibrium in the Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) is the
case in which vendors in both countries accept currency of both countries. This is
analogous to the more standard approach in the NOEM literature as exemplified
by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). Their environment is one characterized by a single
cash-in-advance constraint in which producers sell their goods in both countries and
charge a price in terms of Home currency and a price in terms of Foreign currency.
The exchange rate is then pinned down by an assumption of the law of one price.
The reason for choosing the two cash-in-advance constraints approach as
shown in equations (2.18) and (2.19) instead of the more standard Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001) method of one cash-in-advance constraint and the law of one price
is that the method employed here gives rise to a portfolio decision. The law of
one price is implicit in the two cash-in-advance constraint assumption because, by
definition, vendors only accept one currency and therefore only charge one price.
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As will be in Section 2.2.4, the exchange rate here serves as a price that clears
the currency exchange market rather than a mechanism for enforcing the law of one
price. Furthermore, the currency portfolio decision is an interesting one that has not
received much attention.15 However, both the single CIA constraint with the law
of one price method and the dual CIA constraints with currency exchange market
clearing method deliver the same results for optimal monetary policy.
Using the cash-in-advance constraints (2.18) and (2.19), the money laws of
motion (2.6) and (2.7), and the expressions for the non-proportional transfer in terms
of the Home money growth rate (2.4), country-specific aggregate consumptions can
be expressed in the following way:
cht+1 =







The expression for Home aggregate total consumption is then:
ct+1 =
(







Using the portfolio constraint in (2.17) to substitute out either mht or m
f
t and sub-


























15Good examples of the currency portfolio choice literature are Engel and Matsumoto (2006) and
Evans and Lyons (2005).
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where equation (2.29) equates the marginal cost of giving up a Home-currency unit
of Home consumption for the marginal benefit of a Home-currency unit of Foreign
consumption. Equation (2.30) equates the real wage with the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. Because each agent within a country
is identical, other than for a differentiated production good, the resulting individual
equilibrium wage wt(z) and the amount of total revenues held in Foreign currency
mft will be symmetric across individuals in a given country.
Notice that the first order condition for mft in (2.29) is implied by the con-
sumption demand functions in (2.22) and (2.23) from the expenditure minimization
problem This is because the optimal choice of mft in period t is equivalent to the
optimal choice of Cht+1 and C
f
t+1 in period t+ 1. These two decisions are equivalent
and take the labor or pricing decision as given.
2.2.4 Market clearing conditions
This economy has three markets that must clear—the goods market, the money
market, and the currency exchange market. The labor market clears by assumption
because each differentiated labor supplier is essentially a monopolist who chooses a
wage to charge wt(z) in order to provide labor at the point on the labor demand
curve that gives the highest utility. The following paragraphs describe each market
and the respective market clearing conditions.
Goods Market. Both Home and Foreign consumers demand goods from
both countries. Aggregate supply in the Home and Foreign countries is simply the
production of the representative firm yt and y∗t , respectively. Define dt and d
∗
t as the
world demand for Home-produced goods and Foreign-produced goods, respectively.
Goods market clearing requires that aggregate production in each country equal the
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world demand for that country’s goods.
yt = dt = cht + c
h∗







t ∀ t (2.32)
Money Market. Money market clearing simply requires that money supply
equal money demand at the time that goods are purchased.
Mt = mht +m
h∗





t ∀ t (2.34)
where Mt and M∗t are the Home and Foreign aggregate money supplies, respectively,
at time t.
Currency Exchange Market. After trade has taken place in the goods
market, period-t laborers go to the currency market and make a portfolio decision of
how much of each currency to hold. The exchange rate et is the price that equates
the amount of Foreign currency purchased with Home currency by Home laborers







It is important to note that the exchange rate here is not pinned down by the assump-
tion of the law of one price as in models with a single cash-in-advance constraint,
such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Arseneau (2007). Here, the exchange rate
is a price that clears the currency exchange market in period-t. Because of the
two cash-in-advance constraints, the law of one price holds by definition. Using the
cash-in-advance constraint (2.19) and its Foreign country analogue, it can be shown
that exchange rate market clearing implies that the nominal value of imports equals












This perfect foresight overlapping generations model has one unique nonautarkic
steady state equilibrium. As noted in Section 2.2.1, I avoid discretionary monetary
policy in this paper due to the resulting characteristic of multiple equilibria, most of
which are unstable sunspot equilibria characterized by expectations traps.16 Table
2.1 shows the conditions that must hold in a perfect foresight equilibrium. I define
the steady state international equilibrium given both Home and Foreign monetary
policy (x, x∗) as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Steady State International Equilibrium given x and x∗).
A steady state international equilibrium, given Home and Foreign monetary policy
(x, x∗) is the set of Home consumption of both Home and Foreign aggregate goods
ch and cf , Home production y, Home labor n Home portfolio holdings of both
Home and Foreign currency mh and mf (or rather, as a percentage of initial Home
holdings, φ and 1 − φ), the Foreign counterparts (ch∗, cf∗, y∗, n∗,mh∗,mf∗), Home
and Foreign prices and wages (P h, P f , w(z), w(z∗)), and exchange rate et such that:
• Individual optimization: Home and Foreign agents choose the wage rate for
their differentiated labor input as well as their currency portfolio holdings in
order to maximize lifetime utility in (2.24) and its Foreign counterpart subject
to a budget constraint (2.17) and two cash-in-advance constraints (2.18) and
(2.19).
• Firm profit maximization: Home and Foreign firms choose how much to
produce and how much of each type of labor to use given contracted wages
and a market price of their good in order to maximize profits according to
(2.12). Wages are contracted in imperfectly competitive labor markets, but the
price of the firms good is determined in a perfectly competitive environment
according to a zero-profit condition.
• Market Clearing The goods markets (2.31) and (2.32), money markets (2.33)
and (2.34), and currency exchange market (2.35) all clear.
Following Cooper and Kempf (2003), let φt represent the share of wage rev-
enues wt(z)nt(z) kept in the form of Home currency in period t, and let 1−φt be the
share of revenues exchanged for Foreign currency as characterized in the portfolio
16Ireland (1997) and King and Wolman (2004) are good current references on multiple equilibria in
models of discretionary monetary policy, which builds on the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). See also Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993).
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Table 2.1: Equilibrium conditions given x and x∗








































































































(2.31) yt = cht + c
h∗
t





(2.33) Mt = mht + m
h∗
t










budget constraint (2.17). Then the following expressions hold.
wt(z)nt(z)−mht = etm
f




= (1− φ∗t )M∗t (2.38)






∗ − 1)M∗t (2.40)
Plugging (2.37), (2.38), (2.39), and (2.40) into the first order condition (2.29)
and its Foreign country analogue, the unique nonautarkic steady state equilibrium
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share of currency from sales held for own-country consumption is given by:




























From the aggregate money laws of motion in (2.2) and (2.3) and from the
money market clearing conditions in (2.33) and (2.34), it is clear that the non-







Furthermore, using the definition of the Home country CPI level Pt+1 from (2.15)
and its Foreign country analogue, the expressions for the share Home country rev-
enues traded for Foreign currency balances (2.42) and the share of Foreign country
revenues traded for Home currency balances (2.44), and the currency exchange mar-
ket clearing condition (2.35), the Home country CPI growth rate and the Foreign








Using (2.41), (2.42), (2.43), and (2.44), as well as the equilibrium inflation
rates from (2.45) and (2.46), equilibrium consumption can be derived in terms of
17See Derivation 4 in Appendix A-3.
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steady state employment from the cash-in-advance constraints as:
ch = (1− θh)n (2.49)
cf = θfn∗ (2.50)
cf∗ = (1− θf )n∗ (2.51)
ch∗ = θhn (2.52)
where the steady state employment levels n and n∗ are characterized below in equa-
tions (2.55) and (2.56).
The expressions for the steady state international equilibrium employment
are then found by solving the two equilibrium forms of the Home first order condition
















[(1− θf )n∗](1−θf )(1−σ)−1 [θhn]θf (1−σ) = χξ(n∗)ξ−1 (2.54)
Solving (2.54) for n∗ and plugging it into (2.53), and doing the symmetric operation
for the Foreign country gives the expressions for Home and Foreign equilibrium labor
supply:










where the symbols in (2.55) and (2.56) summarize the parameters of the model in
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∆h (−) always (+) when σ > 1
∆f (−) always (+) when σ > 1
Σh (−) when σ > 1 and θh > 0 (−) when σ > 1
Σf (−) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1
Ωh (+) when θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (+) when σ > 1 and θh > 0
Ωf (+) when θh > 0 (+) when σ > 1 and θf > 0 (−) when σ > 1 and θh > 0
∆h∆f − ΣhΣf (+) always (−) when σ > 1 (−) when σ > 1
Note: The results from this table are derived in Derivation 5 in Appendix A-3.
the following way:
∆h = (1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ (2.57)
∆f = (1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ (2.58)
Σh = θh(1− σ) (2.59)



























The signs of these expressions and their derivatives with respect to the openness
parameters θh and θf are given in Table 2.2. From the signs of the representative
parameters, it is clear that steady state equilibrium Home employment n decreases
in x always and increases in x∗ when σ > 1.
Looking at the equation for Home labor supply in (2.55), the sign of Σh de-
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termines how Foreign monetary policy affects the real economy in the Home country.
Σh =

> 0 if θh ∈ (0, 0.5] and σ ∈ (0, 1)
= 0 if θh = 0 or σ = 1
< 0 if θ ∈ (0, 0.5] and σ > 1
(2.65)
The third case is the most common in which Σh < 0, implying that Foreign inflation
causes an increase in the equilibrium level of Home production and, therefore, an
increase in equilibrium consumption of the Home good by both Home and Foreign
consumers.
If one were to make the strong assumption that the coefficient of relative
risk aversion σ were less than one, the first case in (2.65) occurs in which Foreign
inflation causes a decrease in the equilibrium level of Home production. Lastly, it is
interesting to notice the cases in which Foreign monetary policy has no real effect
on the Home country (Σ = 0). Obviously, when the economies do not trade with
each other, θh = 0, Foreign monetary policy will be neutral. But it is interesting to
note that the case of log utility (σ = 1) also induces the real neutrality of Foreign
monetary policy.
The monetary authority in each country seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
of a representative agent in this economy by choosing Home monetary policy x given
Foreign monetary policy x∗. Define V (x, x∗) as the lifetime utility of a representative
agent. The objective of the Home monetary authority is then:
max
x
V (x, x∗) = max
x
(




− χn (x, x∗)ξ
(2.66)
Definition 2.2 (Home Country Steady State Monetary Equilibrium). A
Home country steady state monetary equilibrium is a function for the optimal Home
money growth rate x̂ (x∗) given the Foreign money growth rate such that:
• the individual steady state equilibrium conditions from Definition 2.1 hold for
each country,
• the Home monetary authority chooses x to maximize the lifetime utility of the
representative agent of its country as in equation (2.66).
Definition 2.2 can be thought of as a monetary partial equilibrium in a world
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monetary environment because it implies a best response function for Home mon-
etary policy that is a function of any level of Foreign monetary policy. Taking the













(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θh)ξ
(2.67)













(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θf )ξ
(2.68)
18See Derivation 6 in Appendix A-3.
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Figure 2.2: Home lifetime utility V as a function of x and x∗
θh = 0.35,  σ = 3,  ε = 10,  χ = 0.5,  ξ = 2 
 



























The first characteristic to note about the optimal Home monetary policy
function in (2.67) is that it is independent of Foreign monetary policy x∗. That is,
the optimal level of the Home money growth rate does not change with changes in
the Foreign money growth rate and is a dominant strategy equilibrium.19
This dominant strategy equilibrium is shown in Figure 2.2 which plots the
lifetime utility of a representative Home agent from (2.66) as a function of Home
inflation x and Foreign inflation x∗. The parameters (θ, σ, ε, χ, ξ) are simply chosen
to reflect values estimated in the empirical literature in order to make a simple
example. The dark line running across the top of Figure 2.2 represents the Home
monetary policy best response function from (2.67). The optimal Home inflation
level at the selected parameter values is a constant x̂ = 1.56, which is not overly
high given that the duration of a period is a generation. Because each country’s best
response function for monetary policy is a dominant strategy equilibrium, the world
Nash monetary equilibrium is the same as the country partial monetary equilibrium.
The main question of this paper is whether openness is inflationary. The
following proposition answers this question with regard to both absolute inflation
rate (Home country consumer price growth rate) and the real exchange rate inflation
(Home country consumer price growth rate over Foreign country consumer price
growth rate).
Proposition 2.1 (Monetary response to changes in openness). The equi-
librium optimal Home money growth rate x̂ in (2.67) increases with more Home
openness in the form of a higher level of θh and in response to more Foreign open-
ness in the form of a higher level of θf . The argument for the Foreign country is
symmetric. However, when θh increases, the increase in x̂ is greater than the in-
crease in x̂∗. Conversely, when θf increases, the increase in x̂∗ is greater than the
increase in x̂.
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
Because the Home country CPI growth rate (Pt+1/Pt) is equal to the Home
money growth rate x, an increase in θh increases Home country inflation as well as
Foreign country inflation. From the perspective of the Home monetary authority,
if the Home marginal utility of Home consumption decreases relative to the Home
marginal utility of Foreign consumption as is the case when θh increases while θf
remains constant (see first order condition (2.30)), Home country agents bear a
19Derivation 6 in Appendix A-3 details why x̂ is independent of x∗.
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smaller proportion of the inflation tax. In effect, higher θh increases the welfare
benefits from higher money growth rates to the Home country and lowers the costs.
Consequently, the optimal response by the Home monetary authority is to raise the
Home money growth rate or the CPI inflation rate in response to a higher degree of
openness.
The next two propositions further explain how the level of imperfect compe-
tition in a country’s labor market, as parameterized by the elasticity of substitution
among the differentiated labor inputs ε, influences the optimal money growth rate
x and the real outcomes of the economy in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 (Deflationary bias of imperfect competition). Both the op-
timal Home money growth rate x̂ and the optimal Foreign money growth rate x̂∗
decrease as the level of imperfect competition increases (as ε decreases). Further-
more, there exist two critical within-country elasticities of substitution for the Home
country and Foreign country (ε̄, ε̄∗) such that x̂ = 1 when ε = ε̄ and x̂∗ = 1 when
ε = ε̄∗. That is, these two critical levels of the imperfect competition parameter
implement the Friedman Rule in the Home and Foreign country, respectively.
ε̄ =
(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
θh(1− σ − ξ)
(2.69)
ε̄∗ =
(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
θf (1− σ − ξ)
(2.70)
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
This result that the level imperfect competition induces a deflationary bias in mon-
etary policy has been shown recently in a different model by Arseneau (2007).
Lastly, Proposition 2.3 highlights the relationship between the level of market
power held by producers within a country and the monopoly power held by the each
monetary authority in international markets.
Proposition 2.3 (Market power neutrality). In the case of symmetric countries
θh = θf , the steady state equilibrium levels of employment n and n∗ are not affected
by the level of imperfect competition ε within both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A-1.
Proposition 2.3 says that the real outcomes in each country (n, n∗, ch, cf , ch∗, cf∗) are
the same regardless of whether the countries are characterized by perfect competition
ε = ∞ or whether any degree of monopoly power is enjoyed by labor suppliers ε <∞.
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The implication of this result is that if any monopoly rents available to Home or
Foreign agents are not collected through producer price setting, the remainder will
be collected by the monetary authority raising prices. As stated in Proposition 2.2,
a level of imperfect competition exists at which all the monopoly rents are collected
through producer price setting alone. That is, inflation generated by the monetary
authority increasing the money growth rate is not needed.
2.3 Empirical Test
The inflation data used here come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
I use the GDP deflator whenever available, and I use the CPI otherwise. A proxy
for openness is an issue is subject to more debate. This paper follows the convention
that has been used in much of the previous literature, which is to treat the import
share (imports as a share of GDP) as the proxy for a country’s level of openness.20
The results in this section are not very sensitive to whether exports are included in
some way in the numerator of this measure.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the median inflation rate and median import share
for the 30 OECD countries, as well as the 25-percent to 75-percent quartile range,
over the period from 1960 to 2005. Notice two facts from the inflation picture
in Figure 2.3. First, the median inflation rate has been declining among OECD
countries since the early 1970s. In particular, the decade from the early 1970s to
the early 1980s can be classified as a high-inflation period. The second fact is that
the variance in inflation rates across countries has been declining as well since the
early 1970s.
Figure 2.4 shows that the median import share for the 30 OECD countries
has been rising since the early 1970s, but that the variance in the share has stayed
relatively constant. Taken together, these two figures reflect a negative correlation
across all the countries between openness and inflation. However, Figure 2.5 shows
that this relationship is not obvious even with respect to simple correlation if one
looks at a cross section of countries. Neither Figure 2.3 nor Figure 2.4 changes much
if more countries are included.
Figure 2.5 shows the average annual inflation rate and the average annual
import share for each of the 30 OECD countries averaged over the 1982 to 2005
20This is the convention used in Romer (1993) and Lane (1997).
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period. The solid downward sloping line is the linear fitted line for all 30 countries,
reflecting a negative correlation between openness and inflation. However, when the
high-inflation outliers of Mexico, Poland, and Turkey are excluded, the relationship
becomes positive as evidenced by the upward sloping dashed line. Both relationships
get closer to zero as the sample years become smaller and smaller. The point to
take from Figure 2.5 is that the relationship between openness and inflation is not
obvious, even when looking only at the simple correlation level.
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Figure 2.5: Import share vs. CPI for 30 OECD countries: annual avg.
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My first empirical test is to run Romer’s (1993) regressions with the addition
of controlling for the level of imperfect competition. The imperfect competition
data come from two sources. First, I use estimates of both manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing markups from Høj, Jimenez, Maher, Nicoletti, and Wise (2007)
for 17 OECD countries. Obviously, this presents a problem because of the small
sample size. The other imperfect competition data come from Blanchflower (2006),
Visser (2006), for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), and Organisation
(1998).
The first column of Table 2.3 shows Romer’s (1993) baseline specification
with the same data and over the same sample period. The subsequent columns
of Table 2.3 show the Romer regression augmented by the various controls for the
level of imperfect competition. Using this sample period, the negative relationship
between openness and inflation is robust to any specification I try.
Table 2.3: Regression of openness on inflation: 1973 to 1987
log average inflation 1973-1987
Romer Union (1) Union (2) Union
(1993) Mem. Rt. Cov. Rt. Cov. Rt.
Import share -1.130*** -1.719*** -1.263* -1.828**
(1973-1987) (0.272) (0.393) (0.715) (0.703)
Real per cpta. inc. 0.038 0.051 -0.912*** -0.037
(1980) (0.070) (0.162) (0.218) (0.187)
OECD dummy -0.446** -0.857*** -1.205**
(0.188) (0.270) (0.453)
Union mem. rate 0.013***
(1978-1988) (0.005)
Union cov. rate 0.006
(1980-1990) (0.004)
Union cov. rate 0.011**
(1980-1995) (0.006)
Countries 114 64 20 44
R-squared 0.167 0.335 0.532 0.352
However, Table 2.5 presents a different story. This table runs the Romer
regression in a different sample period, 1988 to 2002. As was discussed in Figure
2.3, the period from Romer (1993) was characterized by abnormally high inflation
and included the rejection of the pegged exchange rate system. Using the more
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current sample period, the negative relationship between openness and inflation
disappears. Descriptive statistics for the variables in these regressions are reported
in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of regression variables
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Min. Max. N
avg. inflation (88-02) 0.158 0.229 0.004 1.360 124
avg. import share (88-02) 0.429 0.225 0.087 1.314 124
Real per cpta. inc. (95) 7,947 7,623 531 33,757 124
Union mem. rate (88-02) 24.0 17.0 2 80.9 84
Union cov. rate (90-00) 45.1 29.4 1.5 95.0 45
Mfct. markup (04) 24.4 5.6 16.0 38.0 16
Nonmfct. markup (04) 12.4 2.6 7.0 18.0 17
Table 2.5: Regression of openness on inflation: 1988 to 2002
log average inflation 1988-2002
Romer Union Union Mfct. Nonmfct.
updated Mem. Rt. Cov. Rt. Markup Markup
Import share -0.343 0.088 0.062 1.084 1.317*
(1988-2002) (0.423) (0.512) (0.549) (0.680) (0.666)
Real per cpta. inc. -0.340*** -0.526*** -0.805*** -1.384 -1.293
(1995) (0.085) (0.127) (0.129) (0.873) (0.769)
Union mem. rate 0.008
(1988-2002) (0.008)






Countries 124 84 45 16 17
R-squared 0.134 0.191 0.546 0.248 0.340
In each of the specifications in which I control for the level of imperfect
competition, the sign of the coefficient on openness is positive. This result must be
taken with some caution because the Romer regression with the sample restricted to
the corresponding imperfect competition sample also has a positive coefficient. So it
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is not necessarily controlling for imperfect competition that makes the relationship
positive. The sample of countries declines appreciably with each different imperfect
competition measure.
Also, none of the coefficients on openness in the more current sample period is
statistically significant. These regressions must be taken as evidence that a positive
relationship between openness and inflation may exist. Furthermore, additional data
on imperfect competition would be valuable for this question as well as many others.
And the additional data does not have to be for as broad a group of countries if
some degree of panel dimension can be obtained.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model that predicts that increased openness to trade in a
country will increase its equilibrium inflation rate. Supporting evidence for this
theoretical result is then provided by some empirical tests using more current data
than the previous studies. These results run contrary to the negative relationship
between openness and inflation proposed by theoretical and empirical work in the
broadest vein of this literature.
This work begs the question of what is the optimal degree of openness for
a country. This is a conceptually simple exercise to perform in this framework,
although it is analytically quite involved. The parameter for openness in this paper
θ incorporates both individual preferences and policy choices such as barriers to
trade. But θ could be endogenized as fiscal decision that takes place before the







This paper asks the question of how domestic monetary authority should optimally
respond to foreign monetary policy. I approach this task using a dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) model derived from microeconomic foundations in which each
country’s monetary authority chooses the money growth rate with discretion in order
to maximize the welfare of its own citizens. This question has proven difficult for
two main reasons. Micro-founded DGE models in which the monetary authority has
discretion have been shown to suffer from multiple equilibria. On the other hand,
international DGE models in which the monetary authority can commit to a policy
generate a unique equilibrium. However, these commitment equilibria are dominant
strategy equilibria and are independent of foreign monetary policy. This paper
seeks to study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which the monetary
authority has discretion a unique equilibrium exists that is a function of foreign
monetary policy.
Ireland (1997) defines the entire set of time-consistent or “sustainable” equi-
libria in a closed economy setting. His paper is a more fully specified version of Barro
and Gordon (1983) in terms of individual preferences, production technologies, im-
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perfect competition, and monetary objective . In particular, Ireland shows that
a continuum of trigger-strategy reputational equilibria exist in this setting. But,
similar to Barro and Gordon (1983), Ireland finds a unique non-reputational time-
consistent equilibrium in which the monetary authority pushes inflation to its upper
bound. This multiplicity of equilibria can be a problem because it implies either
that all observed monetary policy is supported some underlying societal strategic
threats or that the optimal solution of any monetary authority is to inflate to the
maximum.
Ireland (2000) shows that the multiplicity of reputational equilibria, as well
as the autarkic non-reputational equilibrium, is a result of the strong assumption
of rational expectations. Ireland (2000) shows that relaxing the rational expec-
tations assumption results in a unique non-autarkic steady-state equilibrium that
corresponds to the Friedman Rule. The goal of this paper could be summarized as
extending Ireland (2000) to a two-country environment.
A number of authors have studied the best response functions of monetary
authorities in fully specified two-country DGE models in which monetary authorities
can commit to their policy. Cooper and Kempf (2003), Arseneau (2007), and Evans
(2007) all study two-country micro-founded DGE models of optimal monetary policy
with commitment, and all find unique dominant strategy equilibria. The problem
with this result is that anecdotal evidence suggests that monetary authorities are
influenced by the actions of foreign monetary authorities and that strategic actions
occur among them.
In order to answer the question of how a monetary authority should opti-
mally respond to foreign monetary policy, I will use a model that is most similar to
Arseneau (2007). But I will follow Ireland (2000) in that I will not allow each mon-
etary authority to commit to a policy, and I will relax the assumption of rational
expectations.
The results of this two-country model of discretionary optimal monetary pol-
icy are policy rules that are a function of foreign monetary policy, are not the upper
bound of inflation, and do not rely on trigger strategies. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 3.2 presents the model, expectations, and equilibrium definitions.
Section 3.3 presents some numerical simulations of the time path of monetary policy
under various specifications of the model. And Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Model
The model in this paper is a time-consistent version of Arseneau’s (2007) two-
country model of monetary policy under commitment. I will follow Ireland (2000)
and relax the rational expectations assumption in order to obtain a unique nonau-
tarkic steady-state monetary policy that is time-consistent. The two countries are
Home and Foreign, which are names rather than relative terms.
Each country is populated by a unit measure of identical infinitely lived
households and a unit measure of differentiated goods firms. Each country also
has a benevolent monetary authority that chooses the growth rate of its country’s
money supply in order to maximize the welfare of its own citizens.
3.2.1 Money
The monetary authority in each country choose the money growth rate in order to
maximize the welfare of the representative household in its respective country. The











where MSt+1 is the money supply at the end of period t, xt > 0 is the gross money
growth rate chosen by the monetary authority during period t, and MSt is the money
supply at the beginning of period t. Variables with stars denote Foreign country
variables.
Each monetary authority distributes the change in money supply in each
period t through a lump-sum transfer to the representative household in its own
country.
(xt − 1)MSt and (x∗t − 1)M∗St (3.2)
A useful normalization of the initial money stock in each country is MS0 = M
∗S
0 = 1.
I assume that Home country households only hold Home currency and Foreign
country households only hold Foreign currency.1
In addition to currency, households in each country can purchase country-
1This is not a strong assumption, given that currency can be freely exchanged in the currency
market. An alternative specification is to allow households to hold both currencies and let the
exchange rate be determined by currency exchange market clearing as in Evans (2007).
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specific bonds for Bt+1/Rt in period t that return Bt+1 in period t + 1. The gross
interest rate on bonds purchased in period t is then Rt. This model rules out
international trade in bonds, but Arseneau (2007) shows that this constraint does
not bind due to the functional form of the model. Other than the bonds and labor,
this model assumes no barriers to trade. So the law of one price holds.
3.2.2 Timing
Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing of the model from the standpoint of the represen-
tative household in the Home country. The timing for the Foreign household is
symmetric. The key characteristic of the model is that the events in each period
can be grouped into pre-monetary decision and post-monetary decision. The firm
pricing decision is ex ante, and the rest of the decisions are ex post.
Figure 3.1: Timing of the model for Home representative agent
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ex ante ex post  
The representative household in the Home country enters period t with Home
currency balances Mt and unmatured bond holdings Bt from the previous period.
The Home household enters the period knowing the priorN periods of money growth
rates in both the Home and Foreign countries. So the past data in each household’s
information set is {xt−1, xt−2, ...xt−N} and {x∗t−1, x∗t−2, ...x∗t−N}.2
2I could just as well assume that agents know the entire history of money growth rates, but their
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At the beginning of each period, before the monetary authority chooses a
money growth rate, each differentiated goods firm h sets the selling price of its good
pt(h). As will be explained more fully in Section 3.2.4, a pricing friction is built into
the model following Barro and Gordon (1983) in that the ex ante firm price pt(h)
cannot be changed during period t. Once the firm has set its price, the monetary
authority sets the money growth rate for the period xt and makes a lump-sum
transfer (xt − 1)MSt to the representative household of its country.
Once the monetary authority has set the money growth rate xt, the house-
hold’s bonds from the previous period mature and the household receives Bt in
Home currency. At this point, the household splits into a worker and a shopper.
The worker supplies labor to the various firms nt(h), and the firms produce goods
with a linear technology using that labor yt(h) = nt(h). The shopper then enters
the marketplace and can either buy new bonds Bt+1 with gross interest rate Rt
costing Bt+1/Rt or it can purchase consumption of home and foreign differentiated
goods, ct(h) and ct(f), respectively.
In this model, I assume a cash-in-advance constraint in that all purchases
must be paid for in currency. So the cash-in-advance constraint on consumption is
the following:




where Pt and ct are aggregations of price and consumption over Home and Foreign
prices [pt(h), pt(f)] and Home and Foreign consumption [ct(h), ct(f)], respectively.
Lastly, after the consumption decisions are made, the firm pays each worker
a nominal market wage Wt and pays the representative household a dividend Dt(h).
The household then leaves period t with Home currency balances Mt+1 and bonds
to mature next period Bt+1. The budget constraint for the representative household
is the following:
Mt + (xt − 1)MSt +Bt +Wtnt +
∫ 1
0




expectations are formed using only the prior N periods of data.
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3.2.3 Households
Each country is populated by a unit measure of identical infinitely lived households.
These households maximize lifetime utility by choosing in each period t how much
of each differentiated good from each country to consume ct(h) and ct(f), how much
to work nt(h), how much wealth to hold in bonds Bt+1, and how much wealth to




βj [ln(ct+j)− χnt+j ] ∀ t (3.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, χ > 0 is a scale parameter in the disutility
of labor function, ct is aggregated consumption over consumption of both Home
and Foreign differentiated goods, and nt is aggregated labor over labor at Home
differentiated goods firms. Using the notation of Arseneau (2007) and following
the convention of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), let cH,t be a CES aggregator of Home
consumption by Home households, and let cF,t be a CES aggregator of Foreign


















where ε > 1 represents the constant elasticity of substitution between any pair of
goods within a country.3 Then let ct be defined as the following Cobb-Douglas
aggregator over aggregate Home consumption and aggregate Foreign consumption
by the Home household:
ct ≡ (cH,t)1−θ (cF,t)θ ∀ t (3.7)
where the constant elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign aggregate
consumption is 1, and θ ∈ [0.5, 1] is a preference parameter that can be interpreted as
the degree of openness of the Home country to Foreign goods.4 The labor aggregator
3I impose symmetry in the elasticity of substitution ε both within and across countries. It would
be an interesting exercise to relax this symmetry.
4Evans (2007) shows that θ represents the share of national income spent on imports (import
share), which has often been used as a proxy for openness. See Romer (1993) and Wynne and
Kersting (2007). Here also I impose symmetry across countries on the degree of openness, so














nt(h) dh ∀ t (3.8)
The following expressions for household demand for Home and Foreign dif-
ferentiated goods and within-country aggregated goods can be derived from the
definition of the consumption aggregators from (3.6) and (3.7) and by solving the
household’s expenditure minimization problem. The following expressions for ag-









































θ where γ = (1− θ)1−θθθ (3.12)
where the lower case letters for the prices above are a normalization by the money
supply in period t that will be made clear in the household’s utility maximization
problem.
Let ztt+j and z
∗,t
t+j represent the representative Home household’s expectation
with probability 1 of the Home money growth rate xt+j and the Foreign money
growth rate x∗t+j in period t + j given period t information. Thus, z
t
t = xt and
z∗,tt = x
∗
t because the consumer’s decision in period t comes after the money growth
rates in each country have been established. The exact way in which expectations
are formed given past information will be detailed in Section 3.2.5.
Given the demand functions above, the problem of the representative house-
hold is to maximize lifetime utility by choosing aggregate consumption ct, aggregate
labor supply nt, normalized wealth to hold in bonds bt+1, and normalized wealth
to hold in currency mt+1. This problem is given by dividing the cash-in-advance
5See Appendix A-7 for the derivation. Note that the demand functions can also be derived
from the utility maximization problem, but the derivation of the prices is particularly intuitive in
the expenditure minimization problem as they are simply the multipliers on the consumption level
constraints.
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constraint (3.3) and budget constraint (3.4) by the Home money supply MSt and let
lower-case variables represent either real or normalized variables. Also, from this
point on, I rewrite the variables with a superscript that represents the information








s.t mtt+j + z
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t















The solution to this problem, as derived in Appendix A-2, results in the following


















These three equations fully describe household behavior and come out of the house-
hold maximization problem.
3.2.4 Firms
Each country is populated by a unit measure of firms, indexed by h ∈ [0, 1] in
the Home country and f ∈ [0, 1] in the Foreign country. They each produce a
differentiated good, the substitutability of which relative to the other differentiated
goods in that country is represented by the households’ preference parameter ε.
This is the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) mechanism in which the love of variety on the
part of consumers coupled with imperfect substitutability generates an imperfectly
competitive market in which firms are able to charge a markup over marginal cost.
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Each firm chooses the price of its good pt(h) at the beginning of the period
given its period t−1 information, its expectations about period-t what the monetary
policy, and its effects on household demand. However, following the New Keynesian
price friction laid out by Barro and Gordon (1983), firms cannot change their price
after the period-t money growth rate is chosen. Firms must satisfy demand at the
given prices, regardless of whether the money growth rate was close to the firms’
expectation.
The output of each firm is governed by a linear production technology in labor
yt(h) = nt(h). Each firm pays the same market wage wt to its domestic workforce.
Again, labor is assumed to not be mobile. Because the firm meets demand in each
period given its prices, this implies yt(h) = nt(h) = ct(h) + c∗t (h). However, the
firm must set its ex ante price with period t − 1 information, before the monetary
authorities in each country set their respective money growth rates. So the problem












where dt−1t+j (h) represent the profits of firm h which are paid out as dividends to
the representative household in the Home country.6 Substituting in the expressions
for wt−1t+j , c
t−1
t+j (h), and c
∗,t−1
t+j (h) from Section 3.2.3 with the information iterated
backward one period, the expression for the optimal price level for firm h in period

































6Note that I am assuming that capital markets are closed. Foreign households cannot own stock
in Home firms and vice versa.
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t , are determined by the firm’s expecta-
tion of the period t exchange rate et−1t through the law of one price. The exchange
rate is solved for by substituting all four market clearing conditions (3.30)-(3.33)





I follow Arseneau (2007) in assuming that there are no barriers to exchange
in currency or goods, so the price of good h in the Home country must equal the
price of good h in the Foreign country converted in to Home country units and
likewise for the price of the Foreign produced goods.
pt(h) = etp∗t (h) and pt(f) = etp
∗
t (f) (3.22)
Given the definitions of the aggregate price indices in (3.11) and (3.12), the law of
one price at the individual price level (3.22) implies that the law of one price also
holds for the aggregate price indices pH,t = etp∗H,t, pF,t = etp
∗
F,t, and pt = etp
∗
t . This
is a no-arbitrage condition which insures that Home and Foreign households are
indifferent between holding either country’s currency. It is therefore without loss
of generality to make the simplifying assumption that Home households only hold
home currency and Foreign households only hold Foreign currency.
Now, using the law of one price (3.22) and the expression for the expected
exchange rate that comes from iterating the information in (3.21) back one period
7Appendix A-2 shows that the budget constraint holds with equality.
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A large literature has show that the method by which households and firms form
their expectations of a policymaker’s actions has a profound influence on the policy
outcomes. Lucas (1972) showed that allowing agents to consider the policy maker’s
incentives in a forward-looking manner is a desirable mechanism in economic models.
However, Barro and Gordon (1983) and, more recently, Ireland (1997) show that
the strong assumption of rational expectations in models of monetary policy leads
to a multiplicity of reputational trigger-strategy equilibria as well as a unique highly
inflationary steady-state equilibrium.
One problem with the multiple equilibria generated under models of optimal
monetary policy in which agents have rational expectations is that even a surprise
decrease in the money growth rate will generate a large jump in expected inflation.
Ireland (2000) shows in a closed economy model that relaxing the assumption of
rational expectations in an intuitive way generates a unique stationary equilibrium
that is less inflationary than the rational expectations equilibrium and sometimes
equals the deflationary Friedman Rule.
I will impose adaptive expectations functions on this model that follow the






t+j , where ψ
t
t+j and
ψ∗,tt+j are the expectations functions for the money growth rates in the Home country
and the Foreign country, respectively, in period t + j given period t information.8
When j = 0, the expectation function is trivial because the information is known
8I am assuming here that Home and Foreign households and firms have the same information.
That is, the Home households’ information about past Foreign money growth rates is the same as
Foreign households’ information about past Foreign money growth rates. However, this might be
an interesting assumption to relax.
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t ). However, for j > 0, the expectations will be functions of
N <∞ periods of past money growth rates.
zt−1t+j = ψ
t−1











∀t and j = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.28)
where the expectations functions are defined on ψt−1t+j : R
N




Let ψ represent both ψt−1t+j and ψ
∗,t−1
t+j for any t or any j. Ireland (2000)
proposes the following four intuitive restrictions on the expectations functions ψ.
(R1) ψ is nondecreasing in each of its arguments.
(R2) ψ (x, x, ...x) = x for all x ∈ R++.
(R3) ψ is continuously differentiable on RN++.
(R4) ψ (x1, x2, ...xN ) ≥ β for all (x1, x2, ...xN ) ∈ RN++ and xi ≥ β.
Restriction (R1) simply insures that the expected money growth rate moves in the
same direction as the actual money growth rate. Restriction (R2) implies that
money growth expectations will converge to the actual money growth rate if the
rate is held constant long enough. Ireland (2000) notes that (R1) and (R2) allow a
monetary authority to build credibility over time. Restriction (R3) limits the extent
to which expectations can jump, given any size policy surprise. Lastly, restriction
(R4) ensures that a no-arbitrage condition that the interest rate be positive Rt =
ztt+1/β ≥ 1.
Taken together, restriction (R1)-(R4) impose properties on the backward
looking expectations ψ that look like some behavior we see in practice. The exact




xαkt−k ∀t and j = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.29)
where the αk represent the elasticity of the t−kth money growth rate on the expected
money growth rate ψt−1t+j in period t+ j given period t− 1 information. Restriction
(R1) requires that αk ≥ 0, and restriction (R2) implies that
∑N
k=1 αk = 1.
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3.2.6 Equilibrium
This section will define both a private equilibrium in this two-country environment,
given expectations and the monetary policy in both countries. I will then define
the best response function of the Home monetary authority given the policy of
the Foreign monetary authority. The focus on the Home monetary best response
function is without loss of generality because the two countries are symmetric.
Four markets must clear in each country in equilibrium. First, the money
market must clear in each country, which means that Mt = MSt . The bond market
must clear in both countries, which means a zero net supply. Each goods market
must clear, which was already assumed in the firm problem. And lastly, the labor
market must clear in both the Home country and the Foreign country.
mt = 1 and m∗t = 1 ∀t (3.30)
bt = 0 and b∗t = 0 ∀t (3.31)
yt(h) = ct(h) + c∗t (h) and yt(f) = ct(f) + c
∗
t (f) ∀t, h, f (3.32)
nt(h) = yt(h) and nt(f) = yt(f) ∀t, h, f (3.33)
I now define a private equilibrium in this two-country economy, given the
money growth rates in both the Home and Foreign countries.
Definition 3.1 (Private Equilibrium given Home and Foreign Monetary
Policy). A private equilibrium given the money growth rates in the Home and
Foreign countries consists of the following:






t+j for all t and j = 0, 1, 2, ... as
shown in (3.27) and (3.28) that satisfy restriction (R1)-(R4)
• a sequence of Home money growth rates {xt}∞t=0 and Foreign money growth
rates {x∗t }∞t=0 such that xi ≥ β and x∗i ≥ β
• The Home aggregate price index pt−1t and the Foreign aggregate price index
p∗,t−1t are given by (3.25) and (3.26), respectively.
• Aggregate consumption by Home households ctt and aggregate consumption
by Foreign households c∗,tt in period t are given by (3.14)
• Labor supply in the Home country ntt and labor supply in the Foreign country
n∗t are given by (3.32) and (3.33) and the expression for consumption demand
and their Foreign analogues in (3.10) and (3.14)
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Before showing the time-consistent problem of the Home monetary authority
and its corresponding equilibrium, I will present the commitment equilibrium, which
corresponds to the methods and findings of Arseneau (2007). If the Home and
Foreign monetary authorities can commit to a money growth rate at the beginning
of time, then xt = x and x∗t = x
∗ for all t. The problem of the Home monetary
authority is then to choose a constant money growth rate x at t = 0 given x∗ in

























and Rt ≥ 1 ∀t
(3.34)
where the expressions for ct and nt in (3.34) come from their specifications in Def-
inition 3.1 of the private equilibrium, but with xt and ztt+j replaced by x and with
x∗t and z
∗,t
t+j replaced by x
∗. A monetary equilibrium with commitment can then be
defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Monetary Nash Equilibrium with Commitment). A mone-
tary Nash equilibrium with commitment consists of the following:
• All characteristics of Definition 3.1 of a private equilibrium hold.
• The sequence of Home money growth rates {xt = x}∞t=0 satisfy the maximiza-
tion problem in (3.34).
• The sequence of Foreign money growth rates {x∗t = x∗}∞t=0 satisfy the Foreign
maximization problem analogous to (3.34).
• In each period t, the Home money growth rate x is a best response the the
Foreign money growth rate, and the Foreign money growth rate x∗ is a best
response to the Home money growth rate x.
The first step in finding the monetary Nash equilibrium is solving for the best
response function that comes out of the maximization problem in (3.34). The best
response function of both the Home and Foreign monetary authorities ends up being
a dominant strategy equilibrium. So the best response function also represents the
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Nash equilibrium. The monetary Nash equilibrium with commitment, shown below,
is identical for the Home and Foreign countries because they are symmetric.9





















Lastly I define a time-consistent Home Monetary equilibrium given Foreign
money growth as a best response function to x∗. The Home monetary authority’s
maximization problem in the time consistent case is to choose xt in every period to



































and R∗t ≥ 1
and xt ∈ [β, x̄] ∀t
(3.36)
The definition of a time-consistent Home monetary equilibrium given x∗ is given
below.
Definition 3.3 (Time-consistent Home Monetary Equilibrium given x∗).
A time-consistent monetary equilibrium given the rate of Foreign money growth x∗
consists of the following:
• All characteristics of Definition 3.1 of a private equilibrium hold.
• The sequence of Home money growth rates {xt}∞t=0 satisfy the maximization
problem in (3.36) given the sequence of Foreign money growth rates {x∗t =
x∗}∞t=0.
The next section provides a numerical example of a time-consistent Home monetary
equilibrium given x∗.
9The derivation of this result is in Appendix ??. The Nash equilibrium here is slightly different
from that of Arseneau (2007) because he reverses that Cobb Douglas weights on the Foreign house-




In this section I provide a numerical example of what the time path of a time-
consistent Home monetary equilibrium looks like given different constant levels of
Foreign money growth rates. This numerical exercise follows Ireland (2000). I set
the openness parameter of the model in both countries to θ = 0.25 implying that
both countries have a 25-percent import share of GDP. The discount factor is set to
β = 0.95. The elasticity of substitution is set to ε = 6, consistent with a 20-percent
markup. The scale parameter of the disutility of labor function χ is set equal to 1.
And the number of periods that households and firms use to formulate expectations
is N = 10. The elasticities αk in the expectations function are set to α10 = 1 and
αk = 0 for k = 1,2,...9.
With these parameters, the optimal money growth rate with commitment
that corresponds to Definition 3.2 and constant money growth rate rule (3.35) is
about 1.05. The experiment here is to start the Home money growth rate at a level
not equal to the monetary Nash equilibrium with commitment (1.10 in this case)
and leave it there long enough that all households expect it to stay there. Then
let the Home monetary authority adjust the money growth rate xt optimally each
period according to Definition 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows the time path of the Home
money growth rate starting at a money growth rate of 1.1 in periods t < 0 but
then being allowed to change its rate optimally in periods t ≥ 0. The lower panel
shows the corresponding aggregate consumption levels. Each line corresponds to a
different level of constant Foreign money growth rate.
The top panel of Figure 3.2 shows that it is optimal for the Home mone-
tary authority to gradually reduce the Home money growth rate for Foreign money
growth rates less than 1.3. The lower panel shows how this reduction of interest
rates initially inflicts a cost to societal welfare. This illustrates the key point noted
by Ireland (2000) that the discount factor β is a key parameter governing the ability
of a monetary authority to be able to earn credibility. That is, households must
be patient enough for the long-term benefits of inflation reduction to outweigh the
short-term costs. Another key characteristic of these time-consistent Home mon-
etary equilibrium paths is that the incentive to lower inflation diminishes as the
Foreign country has higher inflation.
This strategic complementarity has predicts that when a country like the
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United States begins a period of increased money growth rates that other central
banks should follow. However, in this exercise, the Foreign central bank has to have
a money growth rate of 30 percent in every period as opposed to the Home money
growth rate of 10 percent. This is a wider disparity than is usually seen in major
trading partners.
This experiment is merely a first pass at studying situations in which For-
eign monetary policy influences Home monetary policy. An obvious next step is to
construct a time-consistent Nash equilibrium. But some good findings come from
this exercise. First, the steady state values in this time-consistent monetary equilib-
rium have more to do with the level of Foreign monetary policy than they do with
the Ramsey equilibrium that comes from the commitment policy. Also, a strategic
complementarity seems to exist between the Home and Foreign monetary authority.
As the Foreign money growth rate increases, the incentive for the Home monetary
authority to inflate goes up. Lastly, these time-consistent equilibrium fall below the
upper bound of the money growth rate and do not rely on trigger strategies.
3.4 Conclusion
The model outlined in this study provides an environment in which to study the
effect of foreign monetary policy on domestic monetary policy in which the problems
of multiple equilibria and dominant strategy equilibria are overcome. This result
is achieved by following Ireland (2000) and relaxing the assumption of rational
expectations in an intuitive way. The implications of the model are that a monetary
authority can build credibility over time if households are patient enough for the
long-term benefits to outweigh the short-term costs of adjusting monetary policy.
As mentioned in the previous section, an obvious extension of this work is to
construct the time-consistent monetary Nash equilibrium of the two countries given
different starting points. Also, the fact that the experiment of this paper starts
each country at a suboptimal money growth rate begs the question of what might
cause this. Adding shocks to this model that move the steady-state around would
be instructive.
In addition, a large portion of the results is due to the form of the expecta-
tions functions ψ and ψ∗. One extension would be to try some more sophisticated
forecasting methods that might be closer to what is seen in practice although still
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not as strong as the rational expectations assumption. Also, adding some imper-
fect information such that the Home household knows more about Home monetary




Proof of Proposition 1.1: Monetary response to changes in openness. Taking














(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ








∆f (1− σ − ξ)









θh(1− σ)(1− σ − ξ)
[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]2
> 0
Taking the derivative of the expression for x̂∗ in (1.75) with respect to θf and θh













(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ








∆h(1− σ − ξ)









θf (1− σ)(1− σ − ξ)
[(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh]2
> 0
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Now the proposition that when θh increases, the increase in x̂ is greater than the





























∆f (1− σ − ξ)













Σf (1− σ − ξ)





∆f [(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh]2
∆2h [(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]
)
=
∆f (1− σ − ξ)[(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh]
∆h[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]2
−
∆fΣf (1− σ − ξ)
∆2h[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]
=
∆h∆f (1− σ − ξ)[(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh]−∆fΣf (1− σ − ξ)[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]
∆2h[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]2
= ∆f (1− σ − ξ)
(
∆h[(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh]− Σf [(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]
∆2h[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]2
)
= ∆f (1− σ − ξ)
(
∆h[(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θf )ξ]− Σf [(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θh)ξ]








= ∆f (1− σ − ξ)
(
(∆h − Σf )(1− θh − θf )(1− σ) + ξ [Σf (1− θh)−∆h(1− θf )]
∆2h[(1− θh)∆f − θhΣf ]2
)
> 0
The last line is true because ∆h − Σf < 0 and Σf (1− θh)−∆h(1− θf ) > 0.




















(1− θf )∆h − θfΣh
> 0
Then, to find the respective levels of ε that induce the Home and Foreign monetary
authorities, respectively, to set their money growth rates equal to 1 is found by
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solving (1.74) and (1.75) for ε when x̂ = 1 and when x̂∗ = 1.





(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θh)ξ





(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θf )ξ






(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ





(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
θf (1− σ − ξ)
Proof of Proposition 1.3: Market power neutrality. When the Home and For-
















where ∆ = (1 − θ)(1 − σ) − ξ and Σ = θ(1 − σ). The expressions for the optimal
money growth rates in this symmetric case are given by:







Now the equilibrium employment level can be written as:






























It is clear that neither n nor n∗ is a function of the level of imperfect competition ε.
And because the equilibrium consumption levels are simply constant fractions of the
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output level, consumption is also not affected by changes in the level of imperfect
competition.
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A-2 Derivation of Solution to Chapter 3 Utility Maxi-
mization Problem
The maximization problem of the Home country representative household is to






t+j+1 given firm prices, Home and Foreign money
growth rates, and period-t information. The problem for the Foreign representa-
tive household is symmetric. The Home household maximization problem, with the








s.t mtt+j + z
t






and mtt+j + z
t















Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the choice variables and
with respect to the multipliers on the constraints, the first order conditions of this
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: mtt+j + z
t










: mtt+j + z
t
t+j − 1 + btt+j + wtt+jntt+j +
∫ 1
0











where µtt+j and λ
t
t+j are the multipliers on the cash-in-advance constraint and the
budget constraint, respectively. Equations (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) hold with equality
only when µtt+j ≥ 0 and λtt+j ≥ 0. From (A.2.3), it is clear that λtt+j > 0 so the
budget constraint holds with equality. At this point, I assume that µtt+j > 0 so
that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality, but this will be shown to
be correct after the other variables values are derived.
If the CIA constraint holds with equality, then substituting in the market
clearing conditions mtt+j = 1 and b
t
t+j = 0 and solving for c
t
t+j gives the equilibrium









H,t+j , and c
t
F,t+j can be found by substituting
(A.2.8) into (3.9) and (3.10). Substituting (A.2.8) into (A.2.2), solving for µtt+j +
λtt+j and substituting that expression into (A.2.5) gives the following equilibrium















Again, substituting (A.2.8) into (A.2.2), solving for µtt+j + λ
t
t+j , and substituting







Derivation 1 (Demand for differentiated good z). The demand function for
individual differentiated good z from (1.30) is derived in the following way:









































Derivation 2 (Firm Demand for differentiated labor input z). The demand
function for individual differentiated labor input nt(z) by firms from (2.13) is derived
in the following way. Firms choose the amount of each type of differentiated labor
nt(z) given the contracted wages wt(z) and the perfect competition selling price of
the output P ht .
max
nt(z)






























yt ∀ t, z
Derivation 3 (Firm output price P ht ). The expression for the price level of the
consumption good P ht is pinned down by the zero profit condition. Set the profit
function equal to zero, substitute in the expression of differentiated input demand
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(2.13), and solve for P ht .



















































Derivation 4 (Steady State Equilibrium Home and Foreign CPI growth
rates). The steady state equilibrium Home and Foreign country CPI growth rates
as shown in (1.54) and (1.55) are derived in the following way. The Home CPI level

































Using the currency exchange market clearing condition (1.42) and plugging in the
equilibrium expressions for mft and m
h∗
t , the steady state equilibrium expression for

















It is the steady-state exchange rate growth expression that cancels out the effects
of the other country’s prices in each CPI growth rate expression.
Derivation 5 (Sign of parameter objects and derivatives with respect to
θh and θf ). Here I derive the derivatives of the parameter summary objects with
respect to θh and θf . A review of the objects and their representation is the following:
∆h = (1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
∆f = (1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
Σh = θh(1− σ)

























The signs of the representative parameter objects and their derivatives with respect
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to θh and θf are the following:
∆h < 0 always,
∂∆h
∂θh
= −(1− σ) > 0 when σ > 1
∆f < 0 always,
∂∆f
∂θf
= −(1− σ) > 0 when σ > 1
Σh < 0 when σ > 1 and θh > 0,
∂Σh
∂θh
= 1− σ < 0 when σ > 1
Σf < 0 when σ > 1 and θf > 0,
∂Σf
∂θf
= 1− σ < 0 when σ > 1






















> 0 when σ > 1 and θh > 0



















= −Ωf (1− σ)
θf
θh
> 0 when σ > 1 and θf > 0
∆h∆f − ΣhΣf = (1− θh − θf )(1− σ)2 − (1− σ)ξ(2− θh − θf ) + ξ2 > 0 always
∂(∆h∆f − ΣhΣf )
∂θh
=
∂(∆h∆f − ΣhΣf )
∂θf
= −(1− σ)(1− σ − ξ) < 0 when σ > 1
Derivation 6 (Optimal monetary rules). The optimal monetary policy rules
(1.74) and (1.75) are derived by having the monetary authority maximize the equi-
librium utility of a representative agent in its own country with respect to its money
growth rate. Below is the solution for the problem of the Home monetary authority,
but the Foreign monetary authority’s problem is symmetric.
max
x





























where n, n∗, Ch, Cf , and C are given by (1.62), (1.63), (1.56), (1.57), and (1.18),














where ∆h = (1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ and Σh = θh (1− σ). Writing Ch and Cf in terms
of n and n∗, the expression can be rewritten in the following way:
(n)∆h (n∗)Σh
[









The following two expressions are important for finding the solution and for un-
derstanding why the optimal monetary policy rules are independent of the policy








and (n)∆h (n∗)Σh = xΩh






















(1− θf )(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θh)ξ
Using the analogous symmetric value function of the Foreign representative agent,
one can solve the Foreign monetary authority’s maximization problem and get the
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(1− θh)(1− σ)− ξ
(1− θh − θf )(1− σ)− (1− θf )ξ
The reason why x̂ is not a function of x∗ and why x̂∗ is not a function of x is be-
cause the equilibrium derivative ∂U(C)∂x divided by the equilibrium derivative
∂g(n)
∂x is








. Both of them are independent of x∗.
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A-4 Derivation of Monopolistic Competition Demand
and Price Equations in Two-Country OLG Model
In this section, I derive the individual differentiated-good demand equations for the
two-country overlapping generations model described in this paper as well expres-
sions for aggregate demand and aggregate prices. This follows the intuition of the
closed economy derivation as first proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The dif-
ference here is that aggregate consumption for each individual in time t + 1 is a
Home-biased composite of both Home and Foreign goods. I assume that consumers
only care about Home-biased aggregate consumption Ct+1 and that the elasticity
of substitution among Home differentiated goods and the elasticity of substitution
among Foreign differentiated goods is a constant ε that is symmetric across coun-
tries. However, I assume that the elasticity of substitution between a unit Home
aggregate consumption and a unit of Foreign aggregate consumption is, in general,
not equal to the elasticity of substitution among individually differentiated goods.
Let ρ be the constant elasticity of substitution between a unit of aggregate
Home-country consumption and a unit of aggregate Foreign-country consumption.
And let ε be the constant elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods
of each country. A realistic assumption is that the elasticity among the goods
of a specific country is greater than the elasticity between a units of aggregate
consumption from each country ε > ρ.
The form of the CES consumption aggregator with a Home-bias term θ is


















































t+1 represent aggregate consumption of Home produced
and Foreign produced goods by Home and Foreign consumers, respectively. The
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exponent on the Home-bias parameter 1/ρ is merely an ad hoc functional form that
makes the solutions more clean. An alternative would be an exponent of 1. From
this point on, I only provide the derivation for the Home country, but the derivation
for the Foreign country is completely symmetric.
If Home consumer purchases individual differentiated goods consumption
ct+1(z) from Home producer z and ct+1(z∗) from Foreign producer z∗, aggregate
consumption of goods from each country Cht+1 and C
f




















where ε ≥ 0 represents the elasticity of substitution among all differentiated goods
of a given country.10 The individual demand equations for each differentiated good
ct+1(z) and ct+1(z∗) for all z and z∗ result from minimizing the cost of consuming
given aggregate levels of consumption Cht+1 and C
f
t+1 by choosing the optimal con-


























where the exchange rate et is lagged one period due to the portfolio decision being
10Appendix A-5 details some of the various forms that this CES aggregator can take resulting
from different specifications of ε.
11The dual problem of maximizing the level of aggregate consumption subject to a budget con-
straint of expenditures being less than the currency held at the time of exchange does not yield the
same result because the multiplier on the budget constraint does not have the interpretation as the
price of an extra unit of aggregate consumption.
100
































Because the Lagrange multipliers λh and λf have the interpretation of being the
marginal cost of an extra unit of aggregated country-specific consumption in terms of
Home-country currency, λk is the price of aggregated country-specific consumption
P kt+1 for k = h, f . That is, P
h
t is the Home country price index of Home produced



































Because the constraints always bind, the first order conditions are:











































Solving for ct+1(z) and ct+1(z∗) in (A.4.18) and (A.4.19) and plugging in the con-
straints from (A.4.10) and (A.4.11) which are simply the definitions of aggregated
country-specific consumption from (A.4.3) and (A.4.4), the demand for each coun-














Plugging (A.4.12) and (A.4.13) back into (A.4.10) and (A.4.11) and solv-
ing for P ht+1 and P
f
















As in the cost minimization problem in (A.4.5), the Home consumer seeks





























The Lagrangian for this problem is:

























where Pt+1 is the multiplier on the constraint and represents the marginal cost of an
extra unit of aggregate consumption. So Pt+1 is interpreted as the price of aggregate
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consumption. The first order conditions are the following:



















































Notice that in the Cobb-Douglas or log utility case when ρ = 1, the ratio of Home
consumption expenditure to Foreign consumption expenditure is a constant.12 Also,
note that solving (A.4.18) and (A.4.19) for Cht+1 and C
f
t+1, respectively, gives Home
demand equations for aggregate consumption of Home goods and aggregate con-
sumption of Foreign goods.














These demand equations are analogous to the individual demand equations in (A.4.12)
and (A.4.13), except that they include the Home-bias parameter.
The expression for the aggregate price index Pt+1 of the Home consumption
12The outcome when ρ = 1 is different from the case when ρ ∈ (0,∞) and ρ 6= 1 in a critical way.
As is shown in Appendix A-6, in the case when ρ 6= 1, an international Bertrand duopoly situation
develops between monetary authorities, and the world equilibrium is (x, x∗). [This last sentence
may not be correct.]
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Then, substituting the expressions for
(
[1− θ]/Cht+1
)1/ρ and (θ/Cft+1)1/ρ from (A.4.18)
and (A.4.19) into (A.4.24) gives the expression for aggregate expenditures which is
implied by the cost minimization problem in (A.4.16):







Now divide (A.4.25) by aggregate consumption Ct+1 and plug in the expressions for
Cht+1/Ct+1 and C
f















Note that this expression is the Home country CPI and is analogous to the within-
country price aggregator in equation (A.4.14) but with the inclusion of the Home-
bias parameter θ.
In the case of Cobb-Douglas aggregation over aggregate Home consumption





























A-5 Properties of International Model CES aggregator
In this paper, I assume a specific case of the general CES functional form for ag-
gregate consumption of a given Home or Foreign consumer. As defined in Section
1.3.2, the aggregate consumption levels of the differentiated goods of the Home and



















where ε is the constant elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods in either
the Home or Foreign country. The aggregator over both Home aggregate consump-
tion Cht+1 and aggregate Foreign consumption C
f
t+1 takes the same general CES form

























where θ is a Home-bias parameter and ρ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
a unit of Home consumption and a unit of Foreign consumption. The only restric-
tion is that the elasticity of substitution between aggregate Home consumption and
aggregate Foreign consumption is assumed to be less than or equal to the elasticity
of substitution among the differentiated goods in either country (ρ ≤ ε). In the
analyses in Section 1.3, I assume a specific case of (A.5.3) in which the aggregator
assumes a Cobb-Douglas form (ρ = 1). The general CES aggregator is an attractive
form because it nests so many economically relevant cases.
Figure T-1 shows various specifications of the general CES aggregator func-
tion in (A.5.3). Taking the limit of (A.5.3) as ρ → 0, a fixed level of aggregate
consumption takes the Leontief form of perfect complements as shown in the first
panel of Figure T-1. Using L’Hospital’s rule when taking the limit of (A.5.3) as
ρ → 1, the aggregator function corresponding to unit elasticity (ρ = 1) is Cobb-
Douglas or log utility as shown in the second panel in Figure T-1. Lastly, the fourth
panel shows that the linear aggregator or perfect substitutes is the resulting aggre-
gator function as ρ → ∞. This reflects the case of perfect competition. Included
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Figure T-1: Various specifications of general CES aggregator function








Perfect Compliments (Leontief): ρ=0,θ=0.3








Cobb−Douglas (log) aggregator: ρ=1,θ=0.3
C = (Ch)1−θ,(Cf)θ









Imperfect competition (11 pct. markup): ρ=10,θ=0.3










Perfect Substitutes (linear): ρ=∞,θ=0.3
C = (1−θ) Ch + θ Cf
Student Version of MATLAB
in the third panel of Figure T-1 shows the shape of the general CES aggregator
function when the elasticity of substitution is at its often calibrated value of 10.
The key result here is that each constant consumption aggregator curve be-
comes flatter as the elasticity of substitution increases from the perfectly inelastic
case of ρ = 0 to the perfectly elastic case of ρ = ∞. The exponent of 1/ρ on the
Home bias terms is merely a convenience to make the resulting constant expenditure
ratio a more simple expression.
It is important, however, to recognize that the common assumption of a
logarithmic or Cobb-Douglas aggregator is implicitly assuming a unit elasticity of
substitution between Home and Foreign aggregate consumption. As is shown in
equation (1.36) of Section 1.3.2, the case of ρ = 1 implicitly makes the strong as-
106
sumption that individuals exchange a constant share of their revenues for Foreign
currency. Appendix A-6 addresses the solution to the model when the total con-
sumption aggregator takes its general form (ρ ≥ 0).
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A-6 Solutions for General CES Aggregator
The purpose of this appendix is to document some of the solutions to the equilib-
rium problem when the CES aggregator over Home aggregate consumption is not


























The maximization problem analogous to (1.35) is the following:
max
mft ,pt(z)


























































ρ = χξ (nt(z))
ξ−1 (A.6.4)
where equation (A.6.3) equates the marginal cost of giving up a Home-currency unit
of Home consumption for the marginal benefit of a Home-currency unit of Foreign
consumption. Equation (A.6.4) equates the marginal benefit of raising price in terms
of less demand and less disutility of labor to its marginal cost in terms of lost income
in the next period of life. The market clearing conditions are the same as in Section
1.3.3. The equations that characterize an equilibrium in this case, given monetary
policy (x, x∗) are shown in Table T-1.
The steady state equilibrium inflation rates are again equal to the money
growth rates as in (1.52) and (1.53). However, because the first order condition for
mft in (A.6.3) no longer implies a constant expenditure share on Home and Foreign
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Table T-1: Equilibrium conditions given x and x∗ with general CES aggregator

































































































































































(1.38) nt(z) = ct(z) + c∗t (z)
(1.39) nt(z∗) = ct(z∗) + c∗t (z
∗)
(1.40) Mt = mht + m
h∗
t










consumption, individuals can substitute away from Foreign expenditure when the
inflation tax of the Foreign country’s monetary policy adversely affects them. A
key point here is that, when ρ = 1 and the aggregator is Cobb-Douglas, agents are
bound to hold a specific fraction of their revenues in Foreign currency. Thus, ρ = 1
renders the demand for Foreign currency inelastic. When ρ 6= 1 the elasticity of
demand for Foreign currency becomes elastic.
As in Section 1.3.4, the steady state equilibrium inflation level is found by
substituting the money market clearing conditions (1.40) and (1.41) and the cur-
rency exchange market clearing condition (1.42) into the portfolio constraint (1.27)
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The steady state equilibrium exchange rate is found by plugging the expressions






Plugging in the expressions for the currency shares from (1.44) and (1.45),
the equilibrium inflation rates (A.6.5) and (A.6.6), and using the currency exchange
market clearing condition (1.42), the expressions for steady-state equilibrium aggre-




























Now taking the steady state equilibrium values of (A.6.8) through (A.6.13)
as well as the equilibrium characterizations for prices and the exchange rate from
(??), (A.6.6), and (A.6.7), and substituting them into the two first order conditions
for the Home country (A.6.3) and (A.6.4) and their two Foreign analogues, the
steady state equilibrium is characterized by the following set of four equations in
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Thus, the policy functions are functions of the parameters, x and x∗, and state
variables Mt−1 and M∗t−1. The state variables are normalized to 1 in this case
without loss of generality.
Because the model with the general CES aggregator (0 < ρ <∞ and ρ 6= 1)
has no analytical solution, I solve it numerically.13 Figure T-2 shows the value
function V (x, x∗ of a representative agent in the Home country. It was calibrated
such that θ = 0.75, σ = 3, ε = 10, χ = 2, ξ = 2, ρ = 2, and x, x∗ ∈ (0.9, 2.0).
The main difference here from the Cobb-Douglas aggregator case in the paper
in which ρ = 1 is that the optimal expenditure share on Home currency φ is now
a function of both x and x∗. So individuals can substitute away from Foreign
currency expenditure if it becomes too expensive in terms of Home consumption.
This induces an international Bertrand duopoly situation between the two monetary
authorities. That is, the lower money growth rate a monetary authority chooses,
the more attractive are the terms of trade for a Foreign country. It becomes a race
to the bottom and the world equilibrium monetary policy is (x = x∗ = 0).
13I discretize the (x, x∗) state space and use a Nelder-Mead simplex search method to find the
solution at each point. The code for this computation is available upon request.
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Calibrated parameters: θh = θf = 0.75, σ = 3, ε = 10, χ = 2, ξ = 2, ρ = 0.95.
112
A-7 Derivation of Chapter 3 Demand and Price Equa-
tions from Cost Minimization Problem
Expressions for household demand functions for individual differentiated goods ct(h)
and ct(f) and within-country aggregated goods cH,t and cF,t can be derived in terms
of prices and aggregate consumption ct using the household expenditure minimiza-
tion problem. This method also provides expressions for aggregate price pt in terms
of the within-country aggregate prices pH,t and pF,t, as well as expressions for the
within-country aggregate prices pH,t and pF,t in terms of the within-country differ-
entiated goods prices pt(h) and pt(f). I use an individual cost-minimization problem
to derive the demand functions—even though the same functions result from utility
maximization—because the cost-minimization problem provides an intuitive solu-
tion for the consumer price level. The Foreign demand and price equations are
derived in the same way and are symmetric.
From the lifetime utility function in equation (3.5), households only care
about aggregate consumption as defined in (3.7). Furthermore, the Dixit-Stiglitz
CES country-specific consumption aggregators cH,t and cF,t are defined in (3.6). So
the household demand functions for consumption of Home-produced differentiated
goods ct(h) and Foreign-produced differentiated goods ct(f) can be derived by solv-
ing the problem of the household choosing how much of each type of differentiated
good to consume, given the prices of each type of good pt(h) and pt(f) and given




























14The dual problem of maximizing the level of aggregate consumption subject to a budget con-
straint of expenditures being less than the currency held at the time of exchange does not yield the
same result because the multiplier on the budget constraint does not have the interpretation as the
price of an extra unit of aggregate consumption.
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where pH,t and pF,t are the multipliers on the two constraints and represent the
marginal cost of an extra unit of aggregate country-specific consumption. So pH,t
and pF,t are interpreted as the index of Home produced goods prices and the index
















































Substituting (A.7.7) and (A.7.8) back into (A.7.5) and (A.7.6) gives the following
114















Likewise, the household demand functions for consumption of Home-produced
good cH,t and Foreign-produced good cF,t can be derived by solving the problem of
the household choosing how much of each type of country-specific aggregate good to
consume, given the prices of each type of good pH,t and pF,t and given a particular
level of aggregate consumption ct, in order to minimize total expenditures.
min
cH,t,cF,t
pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t s.t. ct ≤ (cH,t)1−θ (cF,t)θ ∀t (A.7.11)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L = pH,tcH,t + pH,tcH,t + pt
[
ct − (cH,t)1−θ (cF,t)θ
]
(A.7.12)
where pt is the multiplier on the constraint and represents the marginal cost of an
extra unit of aggregate consumption. So Pt is interpreted as the price of aggregate
consumption. The first order conditions are the following:






















Solving (A.7.13) and (A.7.14) for cH,t and cF,t, respectively, and substituting in
(A.7.15) gives Home demand equations for aggregate consumption of Home goods
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and aggregate consumption of Foreign goods.15












These demand equations are analogous to the differentiated-good demand equations
in (A.7.7) and (A.7.8), except that they include the home-bias parameter. Substi-
tuting (A.7.17) and (A.7.18) back into (A.7.15) gives the expression of the consumer






θ where γ = (1− θ)1−θθθ (A.7.19)
Lastly, ct(h) and ct(f) can be expressed in terms of prices and ct by substituting
(A.7.17) and (A.7.18) into (A.7.7) and (A.7.8), which results in:
















15Equations (A.7.16), (A.7.17), and (A.7.17) show that expenditures on imports are a constant
fraction of GDP, represented by θ. This is the foundation for using θ as representing a country’s
degree of openness to international trade.
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